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Educational Record

- Ph.D. University of California at Santa Barbara. 2002
Thesis: "A Defense of the Biological Account of Personal Identity"
Supervisor: Nathan Salmon
Committee Members: Nathan Salmon, Anthony Brueckner and Anthony Anderson
- M.A. Analytic Philosophy, New York University. 1996
Thesis: "Personal Identity and Spatial Coincidence"
Supervisor: Peter Unger
- M.A. Continental Philosophy, New School for Social Research. 1994
Thesis. "Legal Skepticism and Dworkin's Jurisprudence"
Supervisor: Agnes Heller
- B.A. University of California, Berkeley. 1985
Independent major in Twentieth Century European Political Theory

Awards

7. Professor of the Year 2015-2016. Bestowed by the UB Philosophy Dept. Graduate Students.
6. Professor of the Year 2012-2013. Bestowed by the UB Philosophy Dept. Graduate Students.
5. Individual Development Award from the State of New York/United University Professions 2008.
4. University at Buffalo Young Investigator Award 2004
3. Stough Award for best essay in ethics by a graduate student - University of California at Santa Barbara 1997-1998
2. Siff Award for best essay in philosophy by a graduate student - University of California at Santa Barbara 1999-2000
1. Wienphal Award for Graduate Student Teaching Excellence – University of California at Santa Barbara 2001-2002

Employment

Full Professor of Philosophy. University at Buffalo Fall 2010 to present

Associate Professor of Philosophy. University at Buffalo, Fall 2007 to 2010

Assistant Professor of Philosophy. University at Buffalo, Fall 2002 to Spring 2007

Areas of Specialization

Metaphysics (Personal Identity), Medical Ethics, Philosophy of Medicine

Areas of Competence

Philosophy of Religion, Action Theory (Free Will), Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Law (Punishment)

Articles – Listed by Date of Publication

70. “Why Pro-Lifers are not Committed to Killing Abortion Doctors” with Phil Reed, *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* Forthcoming
69. “Pathocentric Medicine and a Moderate Internal Morality of Medicine”, *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*. Forthcoming
68. “Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy.” With Adam Taylor. *Dialectica*. Forthcoming.
67. “Health, Interests, and Equality” with Rose Hershenov, *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*. Forthcoming
66. “If Abortion then Infanticide.” With Rose Hershenov. *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*. Forthcoming
65. “The Potential of Potentiality Arguments” with Rose Hershenov in J. Eberl Ed. *Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics*. Springer Press. Forthcoming
64. “Purgatory” with Rose Hershenov. Eds Benjamin Matheson and Yujin Nagasana. Palgrave MacMillan *Handbook on the Afterlife*. Forthcoming
63. “Personal Identity and Brain Death.” Forthcoming in publication TBA from Georgetown November 30-December 1, 2017 Conference on Brain Death
62. “Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers” *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine*. Forthcoming
61. “Four-Dimensional Animalism” in *Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity*, eds. Paul Snowdon and Stephan Blatti. Oxford University Press. 208-226. 2016
60. “Can Ordinary Materialists be Autonomous?” With Adam Taylor. 2016. *Philosophia Christi*. 18:2, 385-405
- 59 “Dualism, Panpsychism, and the Moral Status of Brainless Embryos” with Adam Taylor. 2016. *Ethics, Medicine and Public Health*. Special Issue on Personal Identity and Bioethics. 2:4, 593– 601.
58. “Death, Dignity, and Moral Status” *Proceedings of the 2016 University Faculty for Life Annual*. Ed Fr. Koterski. 119-142.
57. “Health, Harm and Potential” with Rose Hershenov. *Southwest Philosophy Review*, 32: 1 January 2016.

56. "Death and Dignity." *Anscombe Forum: Human Dignity*. Eds: John Mizzoni, Neumann University Press. 2016. pp. 93-116
55. "Prussian Reproduction, Proper Function, and Infertile Marriages" *Annals of Philosophy*. Special Issue on Alex Pruss's *One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics*. with response by Pruss. 2015, 63:3, 128-141
54. "The Potential of Potentiality Arguments" with Rose Hershenov in 2015 *Proceedings of the Creighton Club*.
53. "Anscombe on Embryos and Human Beings" in *Anscombe and The Catholic Intellectual Tradition*. Neumann Press. Eds. John Mizzoni, Philip Pegan, Geoffrey Karabin.. 2016. pp. 143-160.
52. "Morally Relevant Potential" with Rose Hershenov. *Journal of Medical Ethics*, 2015. 41:3. 268-271.
51. "Freedom and Identity" with Adam Taylor. *Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics* 3:1. 2015
50. "Split Brains: No Headache for Soul Theorists." With Adam Taylor. *Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*, 2014. 487-503.
49. "Vague Existence Implies Vague Identity" Akiba and Abasnezhad eds. *Vague Objects and Vague Identity*. Springer Press. 2014. 283-303.
48. "Who Doesn't Have a Too Many Thinkers Problem?" *American Philosophical Quarterly*. 50:2, 2013. 203-208.
47. "Perdure and Murder" *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine*. 2011. 11:1, 18-22.
46. "Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism and Moral Status" in *Persons, Moral Worth and Embryos: A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments from Philosophy, Law and Science*. Ed. Steve Napier. Philadelphia: National Catholic Bioethics Center. 2011. 125-144.
45. "Identity Matters" in *The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics*. ed. Manson, N. and Barnard, R. Continuum International Publishing Group. 2010. 33-51
44. "The Metaphysical Basis for a Liberal Organ Procurement Policy." *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*. Special Issue on Personal Identity and Bioethics 34:10 2010. 303-315.
43. "Organisms and their Bodies," *Mind*. 2009, 118:70. 803-809.
42. "Mandatory Autopsies and Organ Conscriptioin." with Jim Delaney *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*. 19:4, 2009. 367-391.
41. "Soulless Organisms? Animalism vs. Hylomorphism." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*.

85:3, 2011 465-482.

40. "Restitution and Punishment" in *Punishment and Ethics: New Perspectives* eds. Jesper Ryberg, Angelo Corlett Palmgrave MacMillan Press. 2010. 33-51.
39. "The 'I'm Personally Opposed to Abortion But ...' Argument." *American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings*, 82 2009. May 2010.
38. "Why Consent may not be Needed for Organ Procurement," (with Jim Delaney). Target Article. *American Journal of Bioethics*. 9:8, 2009, 3-10.
37. "Response to Seven Critics" (with Jim Delaney) *American Journal of Bioethics*. 9:8, 2009.
36. "Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons," *Dialogue*. 48:2. 2009, 291-312.
35. "A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*. 82:3. 2008. 481-502.
34. "Organisms, Persons and Bioethics." *APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine*. 8:1, Fall 2008, 8-11. Slightly different version published in *Proceedings of the Creighton Society*. 2008.
33. "Misunderstanding the Moral Equivalence of Killing and Letting Die." *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*. 8:2, Summer 2008.
32. "A More Palatable Epicureanism," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 44: 2, April 2007, 171-180.
31. "Lowe's Defense of Constitution and the Principle of Weak Extensionality," *Ratio*, 21:2 2008, 168-181
30. "The Memory Criterion of Identity and the Problem of Backward Causation," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 47:2:186, 2007, 181-85.
29. "Death, Dignity and Degradation," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 21:1 2007, 21-36.
28. "Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 80, 2007, 225-36.
27. "The Death of a Person," *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 31:1. 2006, 107-20
26. "Personal Identity and Purgatory," *Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*, 42, December, 2006, 439-451.
25. "Explaining the Psychological Appeal of Viability as a Cutoff Point," *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*. 6:4, Winter 2006, 681-686.

24. "Fission and Confusion," *Christian Bioethics*, 12:3, December 2006, 237-254.
23. "Hylomorphic Concerns: A Reply to Eberl's Criticisms," *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*, 6:1 Spring 2006. 10-12.
22. "A More Palatable Epicureanism " *Proceedings of the Creighton Club. 152nd Meeting of the New York State Philosophical Association*. November 4, 2006, 1-12.
21. "Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for the Biological Account of Identity?" *Mind*, 114:453, January 2005, 31-59.
20. "Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms," *Theoria*, 71:1, 2005, 29-37.
19. "How a Hylomorphic Metaphysics Constrains the Abortion Debate," *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*, 5:4. 2005, 751-764.
18. "Two Epistemic Arguments for Deliberative Democracy," *Polity: The Journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association*, 37:2, April 2005, 216-234.
17. "Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity," *Philosophy*, 79, 2004, 445-472.
16. "Can there be Spatially Coincident Entities of the Same Kind?," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*. 31:1, March 2003, 1-22.
15. "The Problematic Role of 'Irreversibility' in the Definition of Death," *Bioethics*, 17:1, February 2003, 89-100.
14. "The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection." *Faith and Philosophy*. 20:1, January, 2003, 24-36.
13. "Olson's Embryo Problem," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 80:4, 2002, 502-511.
12. "Scattered Artifacts," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 40:2, 2002, 211-216.
11. "The Thesis of Vague Objects and Unger's Problem of the Many," *Philosophical Papers*. 30:1, March 2001, 47-57.
10. "Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection" translated into Russian by Vladimir Shokhin and reprinted in the *Philosophy of Religion: An Almanac*. Forthcoming
9. "Van Inwagen, Zimmerman and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection," *Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*, " 38, 2002, 451-469.
8. "A Puzzle about the Demands of Morality," *Philosophical Studies*, 107, March 2002, 275-290.

7. "Why Must Punishment be Unusual as Well as Cruel to be Unconstitutional?" *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 16:1, 2002, 77-98.
6. "Abortions and Distortions: An Analysis of Morally Irrelevant Factors in Thomson's Violinist Thought Experiment," *Social Theory and Practice*, 27:1, 2001, 129-148.
5. "Punishing Attempted Crimes Less Severely than Successes," *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 34, 2000, 479-489.
4. "An Argument for Limited Human Cloning," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 14: 3, 2000, 245-258.
3. "The Problem of Potentiality," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 13: 3, 1999, 255-271.
2. "Restitution and Revenge," *Journal of Philosophy*, 96:2, 1999, 79-94.
1. "The Limits of Liberal Tolerance: The Rights of Gays and Lesbians to Adopt," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 9:2, 1995, 27-34.

Articles – Listed by Field

Bioethics

36. "Why Pro-Lifers are not Committed to Killing Abortion Doctors" with Phil Reed, *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* Forthcoming
35. "Pathocentric Medicine and a Moderate Internal Morality of Medicine," *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*. Forthcoming
34. "Health, Interests, and Equality" with Rose Hershenov, *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*. Forthcoming
33. "If Abortion then Infanticide." With Rose Hershenov. *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*. Forthcoming
32. "The Potential of Potentiality Arguments" with Rose Hershenov in J. Eberl Ed. *Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics*. Springer Press. Forthcoming
31. "Dualism, Panpsychism, and the Moral Status of Brainless Embryos" with Adam Taylor. *Ethics, Medicine and Public Health*. Special Issue on Personal Identity and Bioethics. 2:4, 593– 601.
30. "Death, Persons, and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers" *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine*, Forthcoming
29. "Death, Dignity, and Moral Status" *Proceedings of the 2016 University Faculty for Life Annual*. Ed Fr.

Koterski. 119-142.

28. "Health, Harm and Potential" with Rose Hershenov. *Southwest Philosophy Review*, 32:1 2016.

27. "Death and Dignity." *Anscombe Forum: Human Dignity*. Eds: John Mizzoni, Neumann University Press. 2016. 93-116.

26. "Anscombe on Embryos and Human Beings" in *Anscombe and The Catholic Intellectual Tradition*. Neumann Press. Eds. John Mizzoni, Philip Pegan, Geoffrey Karabin.. 2016. pp. 143-160.

25. "Morally Relevant Potential" with Rose Hershenov. *Journal of Medical Ethics* 2015. 41:3. 268-271.

24. "Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism and Moral Status" in *Persons, Moral Worth and Embryos: A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments*. Ed. Steve Napier. Springer Press. 2011. 125-144.

23. "Perdure and Murder" *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine*. 11:1, 2011.

22. "The Metaphysical Basis of a Liberal Organ Procurement Policy." *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*. Special Issue on Personal Identity and Bioethics. 34:10 2010. 303-315.

21. "'The I'm Personally Opposed to Abortion But ...' Argument." *American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings* 82: 2009. May 2010.

20. "Why Consent may not be Needed for Organ Procurement," (with Jim Delaney). Target Article. *American Journal of Bioethics*. 9:8, 2009, 3-10.

19. "Response to Seven Critics" *American Journal of Bioethics*. 9:8, 2009.

18. "Mandatory Autopsies and Organ Conscriptioin." with Jim Delaney. *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*. 19:4, 2009. 367-391.

17. "Organisms, Persons and Bioethics II." *Proceedings of the Creighton Society: The Philosophical Association of New York*. October 2008.

16. "Organisms, Persons and Bioethics I." *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine*. 2008. 8:1, 8-11.

15. "Misunderstanding the Moral Equivalence of Killing and Letting Die." *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*. 8:2, Summer 2008. 239-245.

14. "A More Palatable Epicureanism," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 44: 2, 2007, 171-180. 7.

13. "Death, Dignity and Degradation," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 21:1 2007, 21-36.

12. "Fission and Confusion," *Christian Bioethics*, 12:3, 2006, 237-254.
11. "Hylomorphic Concerns: A Reply to Eberl's Criticisms," *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*, 6:1 2006. 10-12.
10. "Explaining the Psychological Appeal of Viability as a Cutoff Point," *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*. 6:4, 2006, 681-686.
9. "How a Hylomorphic Metaphysics Constrains the Abortion Debate," *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*, 5:4. 2005, 751-764.
8. "The Death of a Person," *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 31:1. 2006, 107-20
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6. "Abortions and Distortions: An Analysis of Morally Irrelevant Factors in Thomson's Violinist Thought Experiment," *Social Theory and Practice*, 27:1, 2001, 129-148.
5. "An Argument for Limited Human Cloning," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 14: 3, July 2000, 245-258. Reprinted in *What's Wrong? Applied Ethicists and Their Critics*, Edited by David Boonin and Graham Odie, Oxford University Press, 2004, 688-693.
4. "The Problem of Potentiality," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 13: 3, 1999, 255-271.
3. "The Limits of Liberal Tolerance: The Rights of Gays and Lesbians to Adopt," *International Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 9:2, 1995, 27-34.
2. *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics* by Jason Eberl – *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*. 8:1, Winter 2008, 190-194 (Book Review).
1. *Human Identity and Bioethics* by David Degrazia – *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 8:4, Autumn 2008, 790-793. (Book Review)

Metaphysics

27. "Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy." With Adam Taylor. *Dialectica*. Forthcoming.
26. "Dualism, Panpsychism, and the Moral Status of Brainless Embryos" with Adam Taylor. *Ethics, Medicine and Public Health*. Special Issue on Personal Identity and Bioethics. Forthcoming.
25. "Four-Dimensional Animalism" in *Essays on Animalism* Anthology, eds. Paul Snowdon and Stephan Blatti. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming
24. "Split Brains: No Headache for Soul Theorists." With Adam Taylor. *Religious Studies*. : An

International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion. 2014. 487-503.

23. "Freedom and Identity" with Adam Taylor. *Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics* 3:1. 2015
22. "Who Doesn't Have a 'Too Many Thinkers Problem?'" *American Philosophical Quarterly*. 50:2, 2013. 203-208.
21. "Vague Existence Implies Vague Identity" Forthcoming in Akiba and Abasnezhad eds. *Vague Objects and Vague Identity*. Springer Press.
20. "A Hylomorphic Response to the Problem of the Mental Many" with Rose Hershenov. Invited Anthology chapter edited by Patrick Toner
19. "Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for the Biological Account of Identity?" *Mind*, 114:453, 2005, 31-59.
18. "Organisms and their Bodies." *Mind*. 118:70 2009, 803-809.
17. "Persons as Proper Parts of Organisms," *Theoria*, 71:1, 2005, 29-37.
16. "Identity Matters" in *Continuum Companion to Metaphysics*. Eds. Manson, N. and Barnard, R. Continuum International Publishing Group. In Press.
15. "Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons," *Dialogue*. 48:2. 2009, 291-312.
14. "Soulless Organisms?" Hylomorphism vs. Animalism," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 85:3, 2011, 465-482.
13. "A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*. 82:3. 2008, 481-502.
12. "Lowe's Defense of Constitution and the Principle of Weak Extensionality," *Ratio*, 21:2 2008, 168-181.
11. "The Memory Criterion of Identity and the Problem of Backward Causation," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 47:2 2007, 181-85.
10. "Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 80, 2007, 225-36.
9. "Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity," *Philosophy*, 79, 2004, 445-472.
8. "Can there be Spatially Coincident Entities of the Same Kind?," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*. 31:1, 2003, 1-22.

7. "Olson's Embryo Problem," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 80:4, 2002, 502-511.
6. "Scattered Artifacts," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 40:2, 2002, 211-216.
5. "The Thesis of Vague Objects and Unger's Problem of the Many," *Philosophical Papers*. 30:1, 2001, 47-57.
4. "Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism and Moral Status" in *Persons, Moral Worth and Embryos: A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments*. Ed. Steve Napier. Philadelphia: Springer Press. 2011. 125-144.
3. "The Metaphysical Basis for a More Liberal Organ Procurement Policy." *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*. Special Issue on Personal Identity and Bioethics. 34:10 2010. 303-315.
2. "Merricks's Identification of the Person and the Organism," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (Resubmission Requested).
1. "Organisms, Artifacts and Eliminativism," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. (Resubmission Requested).

Philosophy of Religion

13. "Can Ordinary Materialists be Autonomous?" With Adam Taylor. *Philosophia Christi*. 18:2, 385-405
12. "Purgatory" with Rose Hershenov. Palmgrave McMillan *Handbook on the Afterlife*. Forthcoming
11. "Prussian Reproduction, Proper Function, and Infertile Marriages" *Roczniki Filozoficzne*. Special Issue on *One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics*. Forthcoming with response by Alex Pruss
10. "Split Brains: No Headache for Soul Theorists." With Adam Taylor. *Religious Studies: : An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*. 2014. 487-503.
9. "A Hylomorphic Response to the Problem of the Mental Many" with Rose Hershenov. Invited Anthology chapter edited by Patrick Toner
8. "Who Doesn't Have a Too Many Thinkers Problem?" *American Philosophical Quarterly*. 50:2, 2013. 203-208
7. "Soulless Organisms? Hylomorphism vs. Animalism." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*. 85:3, 2011 465-487.
6. "The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection." *Faith and Philosophy*. 20:1, January, 2003, 24-36.
5. "Van Inwagen, Zimmerman and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection," *Religious Studies: An*

International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion,” 38, December 2002, 451-469.

4. “A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*. 82:3. 2008. 481-502.

3. “Fission and Confusion,” *Christian Bioethics*, 12:3, December 2006, 237-254.

2. “Personal Identity and Purgatory,” *Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*, 42, December, 2006, 439-451.

1. *Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Souls* by Nancy Murphy - *Religious Studies*, June 2007 43:2 2007, 237-242. (Book Review)

Normative Ethics

5. “Freedom and Identity” with Adam Taylor. *Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics*. 3:1. 2015

4. “A More Palatable Epicureanism,” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 44: 2, April 2007, 171-180.

3. “A Puzzle about the Demands of Morality,” *Philosophical Studies*, 107, March 2002, 275-290.

2. “Misunderstanding the Moral Equivalence of Killing and Letting Die.” *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*. 8:2, Summer 2008.

1. “Two Epistemic Arguments for Deliberative Democracy,” *Polity: The Journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association*, 37:2, April 2005, 216-234.

Philosophy of Law

4. “Restitution and Punishment” in *Punishment and Ethics: New Perspectives* eds. Jesper Ryberg, Angelo Corlett Palmgrave MacMillan Press. 2010. 33-51.

3. “Why Must Punishment be Unusual as Well as Cruel to be Unconstitutional?” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 16:1, 2002, 77-98.

2. “Restitution and Revenge,” *Journal of Philosophy*, 96:2, February 1999, 79-94.

1. “Punishing Attempted Crimes Less Severely than Successes,” *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 34, Fall 2000, 479-489.

Articles in Anthologies

1. “An Argument for Limited Human Cloning” In *What's Wrong? Applied Ethicists and Their Critics*, Edited by David Boonin and Graham Odie, Oxford University Press, 2004, 688-693.

2. “Restitution and Reconciliation” in in *Punishment and Ethics: New Perspectives* eds. Jesper Ryberg, Angelo Corlett Palmgrave. MacMillan Press. 2010. 33-51.

3. "Identity Matters" in *Metaphysics: Continuum Companion Series*. ed. Manson and Barnard. Continuum International Publishing Group Forthcoming.
4. "Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism and Moral Status" in *Persons, Moral Worth and Embryos: A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments from Philosophy, Law and Science*. Ed. Steve Napier. Philadelphia: National Catholic Bioethics Center. 2011. 125-144.
5. "Four-Dimensional Animalism" in *Essays on Animalism Anthology*, Eds. Paul Snowdon and Stephan Blatti. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.
6. "Vague Existence Implies Vague Identity" Forthcoming in Akiba and Abasnezhad eds. *Vague Objects and Vague Identity*. Springer Press.
7. "A Hylomorphic Response to the Problem of the Mental Many" with Rose Hershenov. Invited chapter for a Hylomorphism Anthology ed. by Patrick Toner
8. "Death and Dignity." *Anscombe Forum: Human Dignity*. Neumann University Press. 2016.
9. "Purgatory" with Rose Hershenov. Palmgrave McMillan *Handbook on the Afterlife*. Forthcoming
10. "The Potential of Potentiality Arguments" with Rose Hershenov in J. Eberl Ed. *Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics*. Springer Press. Forthcoming
11. "Anscombe on Embryos and Human Beings" 2016. with Rose Hershenov in *Anscombe and The Catholic Intellectual Tradition*. Neumann Press. Ed. John Mizzoni.
12. "Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection" translated into Russian by Vladimir K.Shokhin and reprinted in *Philosophy of Religion: An Almanac*

Invited Book Reviews/Critical Notices

1. *Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Souls* by Nancy Murphy - *Religious Studies*, June 2007 43:2 2007, 237-242.
2. *Thomistic Principles and Bioethics* by Jason Eberl – *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly*. 8:1 Spring 2008, 190-194.
3. *Human Identity and Bioethics* by David Degrazia – *National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly* 8:4 Winter 2008, 790-793.

Articles Under Review – Resubmissions Requested

1. "Death and Dignity." Article on Velleman and Dworkin's Dignity based Accounts to hasten death. Resubmission requested by *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*: Ronald Dworkin and David Velleman fail in their attempts to justify hastening the death of patients on the grounds that their dignity demands their demise. I argue that not only do their projects fail internally for the dignity and interests that they're trying to protect can't do the lethal work they want them to do, but their

conceptions of dignity can't even provide reasons why we should cure the extremely demented who are reduced to childlike or comatose states. I argue instead for an account of dignity more in line with the tradition that our value depends upon the kind of entity we are and thus what ends we ought to realize. Our moral status will be determined by kind of life we can live if we're healthy and functioning properly rather than be dependent upon our present or earlier manifestation of autonomy, rationality and personhood.

2. Article on Health and Disability. Resubmission requested by the *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*. Many disability activists maintains that disabilities are mere-differences like race and sex, which don't lower well-being in the absence of discrimination. Concentrating on Elizabeth Barnes' account, I'll present conceptual problems for the mere-difference view of disability posed by naturalist conceptions of health. Such accounts identify disorder with dysfunction defined roughly in terms of suboptimal contribution to survival in the species' design environment. Since disabilities involve disorders defined as making survival less likely, this virtually guarantees uncompensated losses of well-being and thus undermines the mere-difference view. Moreover, if disorders are understood as malfunctions in the species' *design environment*, they can be removed and thus cured by changing the body or the environment. So the goal of the mere-difference approach to change the environment is itself a form of a cure which makes it harder for the disability movement to defend environmental rather than bodily interventions to help disabled children.

3. Article on metaphysics and abortion. Resubmission Requested by *Mind* (with Rose Hershenov). Earl Conee has argued that the metaphysics of personal identity is irrelevant to the morality of abortion. He claims that doing all the substantial work in abortion arguments are moral principles and they garner no support from rival metaphysics theories. Conee argues that not only can both immaterialist and materialist theories of the self posit our origins at fertilization, but positing such a beginning doesn't even have any significant impact on the permissibility of abortion. We argue that this thesis is wrong on both accounts. We do so, in part, by relying on a hylomorphic rather than a Cartesian conception of the soul. There are good reasons for believing such a soul theory can favor an earlier origin than the leading materialist accounts. We also show that the theological metaphysics of hylomorphism provide greater support for a pro-life position than the Cartesian position Conee discusses. However, we argue that even on a materialistic account of personal identity, metaphysics has substantial bearing upon the morality of early abortions. We then consider the possibility that such metaphysics will run afoul of Rawlsian public reason and thus has no relevance to public policy.

4. Article on Merricks's sparse ontology. Resubmission Requested by *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. Trenton Merricks argues that there do not exist any composite material objects other than thinking organisms. Merricks bases these claims on the grounds that if there were such non-thinking composite objects they would exercise redundant causal powers. Objecting to such pervasive causal overdeterminism as well as the alternative of epiphenomenal material objects, he embraces eliminativism. I'll argue that mindless organisms avoid elimination by Merricks's overdetermination argument but that their existence is not something that he can easily accommodate. Because of the existence of mindless organisms, Merricks cannot maintain that identity is what matters, organisms can be transplanted if the parts of their brain responsible for producing thought are, and that it is

possible for living persons to undergo part replacement and become inorganic, while also insisting that there is not a human person co-located with a distinct human organism.

5. Article on eliminativism of Artifacts and realism of Organisms. Paper defends an ontology that posits organisms but no artifacts. Resubmission Requested by *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. This paper is a contribution to a tradition in which artifacts are viewed as the poor cousins of organisms - i.e., the former are ontologically suspect in a way that the latter are not. It is argued that positing the existence of artifacts gives rise to a number of intractable metaphysical puzzles such as backward causation, overpopulation due to an explosion of spatially coincident objects, distinguishing substantial change from phase change without having to tolerate vague identity or sharp breaks, the lack of a principled way to determine the essentiality of origins, and things coming into existence merely by thinking that they exist. Organisms can evade such quandaries for they are unlike artifacts in two significant ways. First, their existence and their nature are not essentially dependent upon the intentions of others. Secondly, they possess the internal power to acquire, assimilate, maintain, and remove matter.

6. "Learning Not to Kill." I relate my experiences teaching the abortion debate to university students. What is rather worrisome is how weak are the reasons they give for killing another human being. Nearly all the considerations given in favor of abortion turn out to support infanticide as well. I also find it disturbing that their minds are made up before they have even studied any of the stronger abortion defenses, not to mention any philosophical defenses of the pro-life position. One would have thought that they would reflect longer and read far more widely before advocating killing anybody. I describe ten of the worse "arguments" that I have encountered in defense of abortion. The ten include appeals to some considerations that have respectable but ultimately unsatisfactory philosophical defenders like viability, consciousness, fetal parthood, burdens on the pregnant women, inequality between the sexes. Other "arguments" discussed are just laughable such as appeals to what amount to an equal right to break the law, the inability of men to become pregnant, and the hypocrisy of pro-lifers.

7. "Self-Ownership, Relational Dignity, and Organ Sales." Material property has traditionally been conceived of as separable or alienable from its owner. However, if we're each identical to a living human animal, self-ownership is impossible for self-separation is impossible. We thus can't sell our parts if we don't own the whole that they compose. It would be incoherent to own all of your body's parts but not the whole body; and it would be arbitrary to own some but not all of your removable parts. These metaphysical obstacles to organ sales do not apply to the selling of the organs of the deceased. The human being goes out of existence at death and is not identical to the remains. Any objections to selling the organs of the deceased must instead be due to dignity considerations. But the remains lack the intrinsic dignity of the human being, instead possessing, at best, relational dignity. Relational dignity would not provide sufficient reason to prohibit life-saving sales.

8. Paper on Pro-Life Violence with Phil Reed. In our paper, we defend the mainstream pro-life view against assassinating abortion doctors. Our general strategy is to focus on Steve Kershnar's assumption that if a morally responsible attacker plans to kill two or more innocent individuals, then defensive violence against him is permissible. Our first section considers the possibility that the pro-life view can, in various ways, reject this assumption. The remaining sections try to challenge that this assumption, even if it were accepted, appropriately justifies assassinating abortion doctors. We

first suggest that a plausible answer to why abortionists can't be killed even though they are unjustly killing innocents will involve recognizing, as France Kamm does, the structural similarities between abortion and letting someone die. These structural analogues will render abortion morally akin to letting someone die. Since it's widely held that letting innocents die isn't as bad as killing them, abortion will not be as bad as other killings that lack the definitional properties of letting die. We next argue that abortion can be put forth in a way compatible with Rawlsian Public Reason while the illiberal barbarism of say a Nazi cannot. There is a liberal account of rights, personhood, autonomy, etc. that abortionists but not Nazis can appeal. So it may be that we third parties must tolerate and work to politically change wrongful killings that are compatible with political liberalism while we needn't tolerate illiberal wrongful killings.

9. Article defending a limited Speciesism: I contend that health is the key to determining the moral status of the mindless and minimally minded and can even provide the basis of a moderate speciesism. One controversial claim that I will defend is that mindless or minimally minded human beings *always* have interests in the healthy development of sophisticated mental capacities which explains why they are greatly harmed and often wronged by their deaths. A second controversial claim is that there are interests and functions that human beings have in virtue of their species history which non-human intrinsic duplicates could lack, thus leaving the latter with lower moral status. I am not claiming that that any member of our species is more valuable than any other *possible* member of any other species. My moderate speciesism is just the claim that human beings with undeveloped or impaired minds have greater moral status than any member of any other *known* species that has manifested mental capacities equivalent to those of the impaired or immature human being.

Articles in Production:

1. Article on the role health plays in underpinning autonomy. Sarah Buss claims that autonomy is grounded in the healthy functioning that passively causes our intentions and actions rather than to be found in appeals to idealized conceptions of agency. She advocates a True Self and claims that: "We are more *truly ourselves* when we are not afflicted with an illness or disability and it is this normative aspect of our *identity* - our identity as a representative member of our species - that is the key to the special since in which autonomous agents determine their own actions." My goal is to replace Buss's unhelpful talk about a true self and personal identity and species identity with a helpful account based upon our nature as organisms that renders diseases foreign and actions autonomous.

2. "Protecting Persons from Animal Bites." Article defending Baker's constitution theory against some animalist attacks. Defenders of psychological views of identity maintain that we are essentially thinking beings. Their animalist rivals insist that we are essentially living beings and thought is but a contingent trait of ours. The capacity to think is not ontologically significant. While my sympathies are with the animalist, what I mostly want to do here is defend psychological views of persons against some bites of my fellow animalists. I don't think they break the skin and draw any blood. My contention is that there are not any good arguments for why mental capacities can't be ontologically significant despite the claims of my fellow animalists, Olson in particular. i) I will first reject the claim that "Person" can't be a substance term but is instead a mere function term like

“locomotor”— while “animal”, on the other hand, is a substance kind term that can provide an answer to the question “What is it (fundamentally)?” Ironically, it turns out that organism itself a functional term. ii) Then I will consider and rebut the charge that even if some functional kinds are also substantial kinds, person is like locomotor, the wrong kind of functional kind to also be a substantial kind. iii) Next I will show that there is little merit to the claim that there is no principled answer about *when* constitution takes place as opposed to an already existing object just acquiring new properties. iv) Finally, I will show that there is little substance to the related charge that there is no principled answer to what parts of the animal constitutes the person.

3. Two Pro-Life Accounts. Article comparing an anti-abortion alternative to Marquis’s pro-life position. Comparison of one pro-life view with Marquis’s well known pro life position: Embryos and infants are said to warrant protection because of their potential. But valuing potential supposedly leads to absurdities like protecting gametes, skin cells or even kittens that could be technologically altered or put into the appropriate environment to develop into persons. These and other some other reductios due to unrestricted composition can be avoided by recognizing that morally relevant potential is determined by what is presently healthy development (proper functioning) for an organism. . The only interests of mindless organisms are in the flourishing that necessarily depends upon their healthy functioning. They can be harmed when those interests are frustrated. I then argue that my view can avoid the reductios better than Marquis’s well-known future like ours account and can even make better sense than his of the degree of harm due to an early death

4. Article combining insights of panpsychism with dualism. Article merging some motivations for dualism and motivations for panpsychism co-authored with Adam Taylor. We argue that dualism and panpsychism are far more plausible accounts of consciousness than many bioethicists realize. We wed Chalmers and Strawson’s defense of the pervasiveness of experience to Unger’s immaterialist solution to the problem of the thinking many. The result is that the soul’s thoughts depend upon physical composites that though themselves are unable to think, still contribute to a thinking soul whenever they exist. If being an experiencer is sufficient for *prima facie* moral status, the brainless embryo will have it. But so will countless other nonhuman organisms. However, the potential of brainless human organisms can be construed in such as way that it bestows a moral status upon them that is lacking in non-human organisms. Our conclusions about the morally relevant sense of potential should be applicable even if readers reject our hybrid account of consciousness and prefer either a pure panpsychic or typical materialistic account.

5. Article supporting compatibilism with cosmic coincidences that avoid some puzzles of Frankfurt cases. Frankfurt-style arguments against the principle of alternative possibilities have come under heavy criticism for failing to show that people could be morally responsible in the absence of the ability to do otherwise. It is claimed that the Frankfurt-style intervener needs there to be a sign that the monitored agent is going to choose to do one thing rather than the other. But in an indeterministic world there won’t be reliable indications of later conduct. As a result it is claimed that if the world is physically indeterministic, then the Frankfurt-style interventions will come too late or too early. If the latter, they fail to show that an agent is morally responsible in the absence of alternative possibilities. If they come too late, then there would have been moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. I offer a cosmic coincidence Frankfurt-style scenario that rules out the

possibility of alternative actions without an earlier indication, yet nevertheless involves an agent that is intuitively responsible for his actions. We show that our account avoids some of the criticisms that have been leveled at other Frankfurt-inspired accounts that purport to show the existence of moral responsibility in the absence of alternative possibilities in an indeterministic world.

6. X phi exploration of the use of cases in some well-known personal identity papers with James Beebe. We are engaged in an X phi investigation of whether Mark Johnston is correct to claim that the method of cases leads to an implausible *bare locus view* of the person. Johnston is building on thought experiments of Bernard Williams that were put forth as showing that people will apparently adopt a physicalist criterion in one thought experiment that when describe differently led to the adoption of what looks like a psychological criterion. When the story is told one way, people will believe that they survive with a rewired brain that no longer realizes any of the earlier memories, desires and beliefs etc. But when the story is told a different way, they will maintain they have switched brains and bodies rather than remain with a rewired brain that no longer realizes its previous psychology. Johnston claimed that only a bare locus view of the self would avoid inconsistency but that this was a terribly implausible view which reveals the method of cases to be unreliable. We anticipate that many subjects will not respond as Johnston claims but reveal a more common-sense physicalist approach to their mentality and identity. We also suspect that when the order of presentation is reversed, the physicalist intuitions elicited first, there will be fewer people later abandoning the physicalist response with the second thought experiment than there will be people abandoning the psychological approach when the thought experiment that typically elicits it is presented first. When the order of presentation is thus controlled, we expect that it will indicate that the physicalist approach is a more deeply held belief. We are also looking at whether subjects when it is pointed out to them that the presentations in the two cases don't differ in the relevant ways, will adjust their responses in the direction that will make them consistent physicalists.

7 "Compatibilism, Fairness and Hell." If we assume that the Christian Hell is occupied, inescapable, and unpleasant, then the Christian semi-compatibilist who believes that responsibility is compatible with determinism will have to confront two charges of unfairness. The first has to do with the unfairness of an eternal punishment. The punishment seems disproportionate to the sin (Marylyn Adams, Steve Kershner, Ted Sider). The second problem is that if God determined the events and resulting character and choices of the wrongdoer, then it isn't fair that he be punished at all for his actions weren't autonomous. Any punishment for the divinely manipulated would be unwarranted (Patrick Todd). I'll argue that the semi-compatibilist can respond to the respective charges by appealing to certain conceptions of repentance and a Buss-inspired theory of autonomy based upon healthy functioning. This isn't to admit that there aren't other objections to Hell regarding its incompatibility with God's nature. But they aren't problems of unfairness.

8. Article on personal identity and the extended mind with Meghan Roehll. Chalmers and Clark develop their thesis of the extended mind to include a notion of the extended self. An identity problem arises when there is a mutual dependency of extended selves. If two selves each include the other as parts, their having the same parts entails their identity according to classical mereology. If it is claimed that they are spatially coincident selves, composed of the same parts but non-identical, then there will be an individuation puzzle since they won't differ in modal or sortal properties and we can construct a scenario where they have the same historical properties

9. “The Moment that We Die and Cease to Exist.” I will assume that you are identical to a human animal and then argue that there is a precise moment at which you not only die but cease to exist. I will defend in the first half of my talk the so-called “Terminator Thesis” that the human body doesn’t continue to persist after death as a corpse but goes out of existence and leaves behind remains that don’t compose anything. The second part of my presentation will argue that there are logical and mereological grounds to maintain that there must be a precise moment at which the body dies and thus ceases to exist. A hypothetical scenario where more and more parts of a person are being replaced brings the threat of vague identity between the original and resulting replacement person. This vague identity can be avoided only if there is a precise amount of parts that one must retain to continue to exist. So the loss of just one more cell could extinguish someone. Thus I will defend an epistemicist account of vagueness on the grounds that if parthood and existence were vague (in a worldly, *de re* sense) then identity would also be vague. Since the latter is impossible, then there can’t be scenarios where it is vague, i.e., there is no fact of the matter about someone’s continued existence and the parts that they possess. I will then conclude the lecture with some brief reflections upon the moral significance of my claims. I will contend that people cannot justifiably hold certain views about the dignity of the dead, organ procurement as a violation of bodily integrity, and the ownership and sale of bodies and their parts.

10. “Three Mistakes about Personal Identity and Harm to Embryos” **Pro lifers and their opponents both mistakenly believe** that the identity of a mindless human embryo and a human person is a necessary condition for abortion/embryo destruction being a great harm to that embryo. If you and I never were early embryos, originating sometime later in or even after our mother’s pregnancy, then abortion will not be a great harm. So as a result, opponents and proponents of embryo destruction spend a lot of time arguing that we never existed early in our mother’s pregnancy. They spend less time arguing that there isn’t anything there that will persist through the birth and to be found overlapping a human person. This overlooks that even if we were never embryos, there was an animal there that would later have shared the person’s brain and thus their value and capacity to suffer great loss. A much rarer show of agreement between pro-lifers and some of their opponents is found in the belief that the identity of a mindless entity and a human person is a sufficient condition for that entity’s abortion/destruction being a great harm to that entity. Most defenders of embryo destruction will probably deny that embryo destruction is a great harm, but some, perhaps inspired by Thomson-like Good Samaritan arguments will think it could be a great harm but is still justified. However, it will be mostly be pro-lifers who wrongly think that being identical to a person is sufficient reason to make it a great harm to destroy an embryo. Their mistake is not to realize that there could be entities that will later in their existence think thoughts like the reader but early in their existence have no interest in developing into such thinkers. The third mistake is due to Parfit’s famous claim that identity doesn’t matter. The idea is that the identity of a mindless embryo and a human person cannot make it the case that abortion/embryo destruction harms such an embryo for the mindless can’t be harmed at all. What matters to us is not identity but that certain psychological relations. This view is based upon a very flawed account of fission thought experiments and a definition of identity that runs afoul of the rationale behind the only x and y rule.

Books in Progress 164,540 Words

The Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics. The book contains chapters on each of the major metaphysical accounts of personal identity and draws out the theory's implications for when we come into and go out of existence. It then shows how such metaphysical accounts can provide support or obstacles for opposing moral positions regarding beginning and end of life issues such as abortion, embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, genetic interventions, physician-assisted suicide, advanced directives and organ procurement. After a lengthy first chapter introducing the issues, terminology, and methodology, there are chapters on Animalist, Hylomorphic, Cartesian, Constitution, Neo-Lockean, Four-Dimensionalist, and Brain accounts of personal identity. Each chapter includes discussions about when the particular theory posits that someone comes into and goes out of existence, whether it is possible for a harm (or a harmless wrong) to occur at the time of the medical procedure in question, whether the problem of too many minds makes informed consent unlikely or even impossible, and how well the approach in question fares as a general theory of personal identity.

Health, Harm and Potential: A Philosophical Analysis of the Abortion Debate with Rose Hershenov. We defend the view that health is the key to the moral status of fetus. We contend that all living beings, minded and minimally minded, have an interest in their healthy development. Since healthy human beings can obtain levels of well-being unmatched by other creatures, they can suffer great harms when their healthy development is thwarted. Positing an interest of the mindless in their healthy development enables our account to avoid the standard reductions of the moral significance of potential. Since non-humans are not unhealthy when they don't develop into persons, they don't have an interest frustrated by any potential for personhood being left unfulfilled. We argue that our account of moral status can do a better job than McMahan and Marquis's accounts explaining harms to the mindless and minimally minded. McMahan underestimates the harms and Marquis overestimates them. While we argue that we originate at fertilization, we claim abortion is wrong even if we have later origins. There is an early embryonic organism that is harmed by abortion even if we are not identical to it. After discussing the relationship between harm and moral status, we argue the mindless and minimally minded human beings cannot be justly killed to avoid Thomson-style burdens. We also claim, contrary to a widely held assumption, that there is common ground between abortion foes and abortion's defenders and that lies in the rejection of infanticide. We then show that the standard arguments for abortion entail infanticide. So if infanticide is unjustifiable, then abortion is also unjustified. We next defend the incoherence of the position of being personally opposed but politically tolerant of abortion. We end with a discussion of why it is immoral to use violence to prevent the wrongfully killing of innocent fetuses.

Keynote Addresses and Named Lectures

3. "Hylomorphism and the Problem of Too Many Thinkers" Keynote Address at Biola University Graduate Student Conference. November 2, 2013 Biola University, Los Angeles, California
2. "Is the Soul the Sole Solution?" Keynote address at University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Philosophy and Department of Religious Studies Graduate Student Conference *Personhood, Place, and Possession: Embodiment and Emplacement in Special Contexts* May 28-29, 2013 Santa Barbara
1. "The Possibility of Resurrection" – *Albert the Great Lecture*. Niagara University. May 2, 2007. Invited

Invited Papers/Talks

30. "Our Early Embryonic Origins." Eastern APA. Panel of Personal Identity and our Origins. Savannah, Georgia. January 2018
29. "Personal Identity and Brain Death." *Dying a Christian Death Conference*. Georgetown. December 1, 2017. Georgetown University. Washington DC
28. "Owners and Donors" Seton Hall University Philosophy Department, Fall, 2017
27. "Three Mistakes About Personal Identity and Abortion." University of Pennsylvania, Kutztown Philosophy club talk. Kutztown Pa. May 4, 2017.
26. "The Moment that You Die and Cease to Exist" Kutztown University Philosophy Department. May 4, 2017.
25. "Three Mistakes About Personal Identity and Abortion." Franciscan University. A talk presented to Patrick Lee's graduate seminar on Law and Abortion. October 12, 2016
24. "Personal Identity and the Possibility of Informed Consent" Franciscan University. Steubenville Ohio. October 12, 2016.
23. "Death, Persons and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers" (Tentative Title) delivered at the *American Philosophical Association Central* March 3, 2016 Chicago, Illinois
22. "Death, Persons and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers" (Tentative Title) delivered at the *American Philosophical Association Central* March 3, 2016 Chicago, Illinois
21. "Death and Dignity" Clinical Research and Ethics Seminar. Buffalo General Hospital. February 26, 2016.
20. "What Are We? An Online Panel Discussion of the Nature of the Human Person" November 16, 2015 6:00-8:00 pm. Joel Potter, Adam Taylor and Mark Spencer.
19. "Health, Harm and Potential." With Rose Hershenov, *UB Clinical/Research Ethics Center* June 17, 2014. Buffalo, NY.
18. "Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy" SUNY Fredonia Philosophy Colloquium Wednesday April 2, 2014.
17. "Hylomorphism and the Problem of Too Many Thinkers" Keynote Address at Biola University Graduate Student Conference. November 2, 2013 Biola University, Los Angeles
16. "Is the Soul the Sole Solution?" Keynote address at University of California, Santa Barbara

Department of Philosophy and Department of Religious Studies Graduate Student Conference
Personhood, Place, and Possession: Embodiment and Emplacement in Special Contexts May 28-29, 2013 Santa Barbara

15. "Protecting Persons from Animal Bites" Presented at UMass Amherst Retirement Conference in honor of Lynne Rudder Baker on April 20, 2013
14. "How to Argue the Pro-Choice Position on Abortion" Presentation to the UB undergraduate Philosophy Club. April 18, 2012
13. "Perdure and Murder." American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on "Potentiality" American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011 Minneapolis, Minnesota
12. "Embryos, Temporal Parts and Moral Status," Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology. New Orleans, Louisiana. March 13, 2011
- 11 "Animals, Persons and Bioethics." University of California at Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara, California Fall 2009.
10. "Soulless Organisms? Animalism vs. Hylomorphism." American Catholic Philosophical Association Annual Meeting. Satellite Session of the Society for Catholicism and Analytical Philosophy. November 14, 2009. New Orleans, Louisiana. November 14, 2009. (Commentator Jason Eberl)
9. "Animals, Persons and Bioethics." Wake Forest University Philosophy Department, Wake Forest, North Carolina, December 9, 2008
8. "The Metaphysical Basis of a More Liberal Organ Procurement Policy." Wake Forest University Bioethics Center Search Committee. December 8, 2008.
7. "Organisms, Persons and Bioethics I." American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on "Persons, Human Organisms and Bioethics." Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. March 18-23, 2008. Panel Commentators: Mayra Schectman, David Shoemaker, Mary Anne Warren, John Lizz (chair).
6. "The Possibility of Resurrection" – *Albert the Great Lecture*. Niagara University. May 2, 2007. Invited
5. American Medical Students Association. "Why Consent may not be needed for Organ Procurement." University at Buffalo Medical School. April 24, 2007. Co-delivered with J. Delaney. Invited.
4. "Organisms, Artifacts and Eliminativism." *University at Buffalo Philosophy Colloquium*. Buffalo, New York. September 5, 2002.
3. "Personal Identity and Bioethics." *University of Delaware Philosophy Department Colloquium*. Newark, Delaware. January 2002.

2. "Personal Identity and Bioethics." University of Buffalo. Buffalo, New York. December 2002.

1. "Van Inwagen, Zimmerman and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection." University of California at Santa Barbara Philosophy Club. Santa Barbara, California. November 13, 2001.

Presented Papers

74. "Our Early Embryonic Origins." Symposium on Personal Identity and Origins. *American Philosophical Association*. APA Eastern Savannah, Georgia. January 2018

73. "Personal Identity and Brain Death." Dying a Christian Death Conference. Georgetown. December 1, 2017. Georgetown University. Washington DC

72 "Owners and Donors" Seton Hall Philosophy Department. Fall 2017.

71. "Our Early Embryonic Origins" Tentative Title. PANTC Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Conference. Buffalo, New York. July 29, 2017

70. Why Even Non-Pacifist Pro-Lifers Shouldn't Kill Abortion Doctors. With Phil Reed. *University Faculty for Life*, St. Thomas University Law School. Minneapolis, Minnesota. June 8-9, 2017

69. "Compatibilism, Fairness and Hell." *Blameless Buffalo? Reading Group Conference*. University at Buffalo. May 20. 2017

68. "Three Mistakes About Personal Identity and Abortion." University of Pennsylvania, Kutztown Philosophy Club talk. Kutztown Pa. May 4, 2017.

67. "The Moment you Dies and Cease to Exist." University of Pennsylvania, Kutztown. Kutztown Pa. May 4, 2017.

66. "Three Mistakes About Personal Identity and Abortion." Franciscan University. A talk presented to Patrick Lee's graduate seminar on Law and Abortion. October 12, 2016

65. "Personal Identity and the Possibility of Informed Consent" Franciscan University. Steubenville Ohio. October 12. 2017

64. "Generic Health, Moral Status and a Moderate Speciesism." Plato's Academy, North Tonawanda Campus (PANTC) Conference. Buffalo, NY. July 31, 2016.

63. "Is Health the Key to Autonomy?" Blameless Buffalo? Conference. University at Buffalo. Buffalo, New York. June 18. 2016

62. "Death and Dignity." Philosophical Issues at the End of Life. 26th Annual Conference of the University Faculty for Life. Marquette University. Milwaukee, WI. June 10-11, 2016

61. "Should Steve Kershnar be Given Hemlock for Corrupting the Pro-Life Young" with Phil Reed. Regents Lecture. University at Buffalo. May 13, 2016
60. "Owners and Donors" The Ethics of Bodily Commodification Conference. The College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey. April 2, 2016
59. "Death, Persons and Sparse Ontologies: The Problem of Too Many Dying Thinkers" delivered at the *American Philosophical Association Central* March 3, 2016 Chicago, Illinois
58. "Death and Dignity" Clinical Research and Ethics Seminar. Buffalo General Hospital. February 26, 2016.
57. "What Are We? An Online Panel Discussion of the Nature of the Human Person" November 16, 2015 6:00-8:00 pm. Joel Potter, Adam Taylor and Mark Spencer.
56. "Health, Harm and Potential." November 6-8, 2015. Southwestern Philosophical Society. Nashville Tennessee
55. "The Potential of Potentiality Arguments" with Rose Hershenov. 2015 Creighton Club Meeting. Syracuse University. Syracuse New York, November 7, 2015
54. "Why Materialists are Committed to Perversion" with Adam Taylor. Lighthearted Philosophers' Association. Deerfield Beach, Florida. October 9-10 2015,.
53. "Can the Secular be Autonomous?" Presented. Delivered by co-author Adam Taylor at the June 26-27 2015 Blameless Buffalo? Conference, Buffalo New York
52. "Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy" Blameless Buffalo? Conference June 26-27 2015. University at Buffalo, Buffalo New York
51. "Generic Health" Plato's Academy, North Tonawanda Campus (PANTC) Conference. July 30-August 1 2015. University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY
50. "Death and Dignity" Anscombe Forum: Human Dignity. Neuman University, Alston, Pennsylvania. March 13 2014, 2015.
49. "Freedom and Identity" (delivered by co-author Adam Taylor) Free Will Conference, Flint Michigan, November 10, 2015
48. "Health, Harm and Potential" with Rose Hershenov. Annual Virginia Philosophical Association Conference. October 7, 2014 Washington and Lee University. Lexington Virginia
47. "Autonomy and Identity" (delivered by co-author Adam Taylor) November 9, Midwest Conference on Philosophy. Northwestern University. Evanston New York

46. "Freedom and Identity" (delivered by co-author Adam Taylor). Annual Meeting of The Minnesota Philosophical Society on Oct. 3rd at the University of Minnesota at Duluth.
45. "Health, Harm and Potential" with Rose Hershenov, *PANTC Conference*. University at Buffalo, August 1-2, 2014
44. "Health, Harm and Potential." With Rose Hershenov, *UB Clinical/Research Ethics Center* June 17, 2014. Buffalo, NY.
43. "Morally Relevant Potential" with Rose Hershenov. 8th Felician College Ethics Conference. Rutherford, New York. April 26, 2014
42. "Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy" SUNY Fredonia Philosophy Colloquium Wednesday April 2, 2014.
41. "Anscombe on Embryos and Persons" with Rose Hershenov, *Anscombe: Contributions to the Catholic Intellectual Tradition Conference*, Neuman University, Aston Pa. March 15, 2014,
39. "The Costs of a Materialist Account of Mind" *Southern Society of Psychology and Philosophy Conference* Feb 6-8, 2014 Charleston College. Charleston, South Carolina
- 38." Hylomorphism and the Problem of Too Many Thinkers" Keynote Address at Biola University Graduate Student Conference. November 2, 2013 Biola University, Los Angeles
37. "Is the Soul the Sole Solution?" *Society for Christian Philosophy's Eastern Division Conference*. University of South Florida, Tampa Florida. October 24-26. 2013
36. "Healthy Development and the Potential that Matters." *PANTC Conference*. University at Buffalo, Buffalo New York. August 2-3, 2013. Paper sent to conference participants. Due to time constraints, a different paper was delivered "Morally Relevant Potential."
35. "Is the Soul the Sole Solution?" Keynote address at University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Philosophy and Department of Religious Studies Graduate Student Conference *Personhood, Place, and Possession: Embodiment and Emplacement in Special Contexts* May 28-29, 2013 Santa Barbara
34. "Protecting Persons from Animal Bites" Presented at UMass Amherst Retirement Conference in honor of Lynne Rudder Baker on April 20, 2013
- 32 South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference. "Morally Relevant Potential." Charleston, South Carolina March 8-9, 2013
31. "Split Brains: No Headache for the Soul Theorist." With Adam Taylor. Western New York American Catholic Philosophical Association. Canisius College, Buffalo New York. November 17,

2012

30. "Morally Relevant Potential" with Rose Hershenov. Presented at the New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association, Bergen Community College, Lyndhurst New Jersey, November 10, 2012

29. "How to Argue the Pro-Choice Position on Abortion" Presentation to the UB undergraduate Philosophy Club. April 18, 2012

28. "Dualism, Panpsychism and the Bioethical Status of the Brainless" UB Lunchtime Philosophy Talks. Park Hall 141. University at Buffalo. November 11, 2011

27. "Perdure and Murder." UB Lunchtime Philosophy Talks. Park Hall 141. University at Buffalo. April 29, 2011

26. "Perdure and Murder." American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on "Potentiality" American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011 Minneapolis, Minnesota

25. "Embryos, Temporal Parts and Moral Status," Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology. New Orleans, Louisiana. March 13, 2011

24. "A Comparison of Hylomorphic and Animalist Conceptions of the Afterlife." Western New York and Northwest Pennsylvania Regional Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. April 17, 2010, Canisius College. Buffalo, New York

23. "The I'm Personally Opposed to Abortion But...Argument." (with Rose Hershenov). American Catholic Philosophical Association. New Orleans, Louisiana. November 13-14, 2009.

22. "Animals, Persons and Bioethics." University of California at Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara, California Fall 2009.

21. "Soulless Organisms? Animalism vs. Hylomorphism." American Catholic Philosophical Association Annual Meeting. Satellite Session of the Society for Catholicism and Analytical Philosophy. November 14, 2009. New Orleans, Louisiana. November 14, 2009. (Commentator Jason Eberl)

20. "The I'm Personally Opposed to Abortion But...Argument." (with Rose Hershenov) Western New York and Western Pennsylvania Regional Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Canisius College. Buffalo, New York. May 1, 2009

19. "A Justification for Organ Conscriptation" with James Delaney. Center for Thomistic Studies. Ethics of Organ Transplantation Conference. University of Saint Thomas, Houston, Texas, March 27-29. Paper delivered by co-author Jim Delaney.

18. "Animals, Persons and Bioethics." Wake Forest University Philosophy Department, Wake Forest, North Carolina, December 9, 2008

17. "The Metaphysical Basis of a More Liberal Organ Procurement Policy." Wake Forest University Bioethics Center Search Committee. December 8, 2008.
16. "Organisms, Persons and Bioethics II" *Creighton Club*. Hobart and William Smith Colleges. Geneva, New York. October 18, 2008. (Commentator: Ben Bradley).
15. "Organisms, Persons and Bioethics I." American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on "Persons, Human Organisms and Bioethics." Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. March 18-23, 2008. Panel Commentators: Mayra Schectman, David Shoemaker, Mary Anne Warren, John Lizz (chair).
14. "Mandatory Autopsies and Organ Conscriptation," Association for Practical and Professional Ethics. Seventeenth Annual Meeting. February 21-24, San Antonio, Texas.
13. *Hylomorphism and Personal Identity Thought Experiments*. Western New York and Western Pennsylvania Regional Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Canisius College, Buffalo, New York. November 17, 2007.
12. "Organisms, Brains and their Parts." *University at Buffalo Philosophy of Biology Workshop*. Buffalo, New York. September 29, 2007.
11. "The Possibility of Resurrection" – *Albert the Great Lecture*. Niagara University. May 2, 2007. Invited
10. American Medical Students Association. "Why Consent may not be needed for Organ Procurement." University at Buffalo Medical School. April 24, 2007. Co-delivered with J. Delaney. Invited.
9. "A More Palatable Epicureanism." *Creighton Club*. Hobart College. November 4, 2006. (Commentator: Ben Bradley.)
8. "Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers." *American Catholic Philosophical Association 2006 Annual Meeting*. Denison University, Grandville, Ohio. October, 27-29, 2006. (Commentator: Jason Eberl.)
7. "Personal Identity and Purgatory." *Selves, Souls and Survival Conference*. Society for Christian Philosophers Pacific Regional Meeting. University of San Diego. San Diego, California. February 16-18, 2006. (Commentator: Aaron Schiller.)
6. "The Definition of Death." *University at Buffalo Metaphysics of Medicine Conference*. Buffalo, New York. November 13, 2004.
5. "Organisms, Artifacts and Eliminativism." *University at Buffalo Philosophy Colloquium*. Buffalo, New York. September 5, 2002.

4. "The Subject of Thought." *University at Buffalo Workshop on Intentionality and its Biological Foundations*. Buffalo, New York. February 1, 2003.
3. "Personal Identity and Bioethics." *University of Delaware Philosophy Department Colloquium*. Newark, Delaware. January 2002.
2. "Personal Identity and Bioethics." University of Buffalo. Buffalo, New York. December 2002.
1. "Van Inwagen, Zimmerman and the Materialist Conception of Resurrection." University of California at Santa Barbara Philosophy Club. Santa Barbara, California. November 13, 2001.

Comments Delivered at Conferences

11. Comments on Rivka Weinberg's "You only Die Once" International Association for the Philosophy of Death and Dying." Syracuse, New York. May 19, 2016
10. Comments on Mayra Schechtman's paper. Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Chicago, Illinois. March 3, 2016.
9. Comments on Don Marquis's paper. Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Chicago Illinois, March 3, 2016
8. Comments on John Lizza's paper, Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. APA Chicago March 3, 2016
7. Comments on Allison Thornton, "Surviving Death as Immaterial Animals." Society of Christian Philosophy satellite of American Catholic Philosophical Association annual conference, Washington DC. November 11, 2014
6. Comments on John Lizza's "Potential, Possibility and Ethical Relevance." American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on "Potentiality" American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011 Minneapolis, Minnesota
5. Comments on Bertha Alvarez Mettinen's "Why Fetal Potential Matters" American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on "Potentiality" American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011 Minneapolis, Minnesota
4. Comments on Mary Anne Warren. Pacific APA "What Would Kant Have Said about Abortion and Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and Why Does It Matter?" APA. Panel on Organisms, Persons and Bioethics. Pasadena, California. March 19, 2008.
3. Comments on Jason Eberl's "The Unactualized Potential of PVS Patients". American Philosophical Association Committee on Philosophy and Medicine Panel on "Potentiality" American Philosophical Association. Central Meeting. March 31, 2011 Minneapolis, Minnesota

2. Comments on Mayra Schectman's "Persons and the Practical". Panel on Organisms, Persons and Bioethics. Pacific APA, Pasadena California. March 19, 2008

1. Comments on David Shoemaker's "What's Identity Got to do with It"? Pacific APA, March 19, 2008

Talks to Non-Academic Audiences

"How to Respond to Some Common Abortion Arguments" at St. Theresa's Roman Catholic Church in Buffalo, NY March 21, 2012

"How to Respond to Some Common Abortion Arguments" at St John the Baptist Roman Catholic Church in Kenmore, New York on May 24, 2012

Professional Service

External Letter Writer for Distinguished University Professor Fall 2014

External Letter Writer for Tenure Evaluation Summer 2013

External Letter Writer for Promotion to Distinguished Teaching Professor December 2015

External Letter Writer for Promotion to Distinguished Teaching Professor. 2012?

Philosophy Department External Review East Carolina University. February 23-24, 2012

Panel Chair APA Central Division Talk by Joungbin Lim (University of Virginia), "Two Dilemmas of the Eliminativist Ontology of Brains" Minneapolis, Minnesota. April 01, 2011

Organized Buffalo-area colleges reading group in preparation for John Fischer's Hourani Lectures Reading Group, Summer 2008.

Organized Buffalo-area colleges reading group in preparation for David Velleman's Hourani Lectures Reading Group, December 2010 – January 2011

Organized Buffalo-area colleges reading group in preparation for Michael Smith's Hourani Lectures (March and April 2012)

Organized Buffalo-area colleges reading group in preparation for David Oderberg's Hourani Lectures (Summer 2013)

Organized Buffalo-area college reading group in preparation for Rae Langton's Hourani Lectures.

Co-Founded (with Neil Williams) Western New York Metaphysics Reading group called the Vienna Circle: Cheektowaga Chapter. It is a Buffalo-area colleges faculty reading group in Metaphysics. Fall 2010 to Spring 2013

Co-Founded (with James Delaney) Western New York Bioethics Reading Group called PANTC – Plato’s Academy: North Tonawanda Chapter. It s a Buffalo-area colleges faculty and graduate student reading group on Bioethics. April 2011 to the present.

Co-Founded (with Neil Williams) metaphysics discussion group called “BUMS” – Buffalo University Metaphysics Society. We read books rather than articles and also discuss each others’ works in progress. Spring 2012 to Summer 2013.

Co-Founded (with Steven Kershnar) free will and moral responsibility reading group called “Blameless Buffalo?” Fall 2013 to the present

Refereeing for the following Peer Reviewed Journals and Presses:

Mind (twice)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (six times)

Social Theory and Practice (Five Times)

Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Three Times)

Journal of Social Philosophy

The Philosophical Quarterly (Three Times)

Mind and Machines

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review

The Monist (Twenty + times)

Public Affairs Quarterly (Nine times)

Philosophia (four times)

Philosophical Papers (twice)

Philosophical Studies (twice)

Journal of Moral Philosophy

Southern Journal of Philosophy (Twice)

Erkenntnis (three times)

American Philosophical Quarterly

Journal of Medical Ethics

Journal of Philosophical Research (twice)

Neuroethics.

Press Referee (Book length manuscripts)

Oxford University Press (three times)

Editorial Work

Guest Editor of *The Monist*, “Coming Into Being and Passing Away.” 98:3, July 2006.

Guest co-Editor (with Randy Dipert) of *The Monist*. “Composition and Constitution.” Forthcoming

Conferences Organized

Co-organizer (with Barry Smith) of *Metaphysics of Medicine Conference*. University at Buffalo. November 13-14, 2004.

Co-organizer (with Randall Dipert and Barry Smith) *The Philosophy of E.J. Lowe*. University at Buffalo. April 7-9, 2006.

Co-organizer (with Randall Dipert) *The Philosophy of Lynne Baker: The Metaphysics of Everyday Life*. University at Buffalo. April 24-25, 2009.

PANTC Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference. University at Buffalo, August 2-3, 2013. Keynoter John Martin Fischer

PANTC Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine Conference. Buffalo, New York. August 1-2, 2014 . Keynoter Christopher Boorse

Blameless Buffalo? Conference on free will and moral responsibility. Keynoter John Fischer. Buffalo New York June 26-27, 2015

PANTC Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Conference 2015. University at Buffalo, July30-August 1, 2015 Keynoters Jerry Wakefield and Chris Boorse

Blameless Buffalo” Conference on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Keynoter Steve Kershnar, Plenary Speaker John Keller. Buffalo, New York. June 18, 2016.

PANTC Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Conference: Keynoters David Boonin and Elseljin Kingma. July 28-31. Buffalo, New York

Blameless Buffalo? Conference on Free will and Moral Responsibility. University at Buffalo. Buffalo, New York.; May 20, 2017

PANTC Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine Conference: Keynotes Don Marquis, John Lizza, and Mayra Schechtman. July 28-30. Buffalo, New York

Debates Organized

“What Survives Death: The Person or the Soul?” David Oderberg v. Patrick Toner. September 26, 2013

“Is Abortion Ethical?” Catherine Nolan vs. Steve Kershnar March 5, 2014.

“Does the Soul Exist” David Limbaugh, Jon Houston, Shane Hemmer vs. Brian Donahue, Steven McAndrew, Justin Murray. March 5, 2015

“Does the Existence of Evil Show that God does not exist?” David Limbaugh vs. Neil Otte. April 16, 2015

“Do we have Free will and are we Moral Responsible?” Dr. John Keller vs. Dr. Steve Kershner
October 22, 2015

“Does Evolution undermine Moral Realism?” Jake Monaghan vs. Brendan Cline Fall 2015

Debate Participant

Internet debate on Personal Identity sponsored by Dr. Joel Potter of the University of Alaska
Philosophy Department. 11/16/16

Debate on Abortion with Catherine Nolan, Christian Andzel, Ken Ehrenberg et al, sponsored by UB
Pro Life club and UB Philosophy Department Club. 4/5/12

Teaching

Graduate Seminars

Philosophy of Medicine: Theory and Practice

The Soul

Bioethics (three times)

The Subject of Thought

Philosophy of Science

Evolution and Epistemology

Philosophy of Medicine

Personal Identity

Teaching Philosophy (twice)

The Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics

First Year Intensive Writing Seminar

Teaching Bioethics (One day workshop for graduate instructors that I have taught 8 times)

Intensive Writing Seminar for First Year Graduate Students

Undergraduate Courses

Bioethics (30 + times)

Introduction to Philosophy (2)

Philosophy of Law (2)

Introductory Ethics (5)

Business and Professional Ethics (2)

Advanced Ethical Theory (1)

Early Modern Philosophy (1)

Ancient Philosophy (1)

Critical Thinking (1)

Summer Teaching (6 week intensive sessions.)

2003- Social and Ethical Values in Medicine

2004 - Introduction to Philosophy; Social and Ethical Values in Medicine

2005 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine

2006 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine

2007 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine

2008 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine

2009 - Social and Ethical Values in Medicine; Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics

Independent Studies Directed

Independent Graduate Study in Personal Identity (Mark Niswonger) Spring 2004

Independent Undergraduate Study in Bioethics (Melanie Arison) Spring 2003

Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Ryan Kohl) Fall 2002

Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Andrea Ott) Fall 2004

Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Elisa Ruhl) Fall 2004

Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Todd Bindig) Fall 2004

Independent Graduate Study in the Foundations of Bioethics (Steve Halady) Fall 2007

Independent Graduate Study in Catholic Bioethics (Mark Spencer) Fall 2008

Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Peter Koch) Fall 2008

Independent Graduate Study in the Foundation of Bioethics (Adam Taylor) Fall 2008

Independent Graduate Study in The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death (Peter Koch) Spring 2009

Independent Graduate Study in Bioethics (Yuichi Minemura) Fall 2010

Independent Undergraduate Honors Course in the Badness of Death (Brendon Bochacki) Fall 2010

Independent Graduate Study in Christian Philosophy (Peter Koch) Spring 2011

Independent Graduate Study in Christian Philosophy (Catherine Nolan) Fall 2011

Independent Graduate Study in Christian Philosophy (David Hahn) Fall 2011

Independent Graduate Study in the Philosophy of Mind (Catherine Nolan) Spring 2012

Independent Graduate Study in Metaphysics (Clint Dowland) Spring 2013

Independent Graduate Study in the Philosophy of Medicine (Catherine Nolan) Spring 2013

Independent Undergraduate Study on hylomorphism and bioethics (Katherine Boniello) Fall 2015

Independent Graduate Study in Free will and Moral Responsibility (David Limbaugh) Spring 2016

Independent Graduate Study on Manipulation Cases and Responsibility (Robert Kelly) Spring 2016

Reading Groups Directed

Led two Fall 2002 Bioethics Reading Groups - Jeff McMahan's *Ethics of Killings at the Margins of Life*

Led Spring 2003 Bioethics Reading Group - Daniel Brock, Allen Buchanan, Norman Daniels, Daniel Wikler's *Genetics and Justice: From Chance to Choice*.

Led Summer First Session 2004 Bioethics Reading Group - H. Tristram Englehardt's *The Foundations of Bioethics*

Led Summer Second Session 2004 Bioethics Reading Group - H. Tristram Englehardt's *The Foundations of Christian Bioethics*

UB Faculty Metaphysics and Epistemology Reading Group. 2006-2007

WNY faculty reading group on John Fischer's *My Way* – Summer 2008

WNY faculty reading group on David Velleman's Hourani Lectures Winter 2010-2011

WNY Faculty reading group preparing for Oderberg's Hourani 2013 Lectures

Vienna Circle, Cheektowaga Chapter. Faculty Metaphysics Reading Group Fall 2010 to Fall 2012

Plato's Academy, North Tonawanda Campus. Faculty/Grad Bioethics Reading Group Summer 2011 to present

Blameless Buffalo? Faculty/Grad Free will & Moral Responsibility Reading group. Fall 2013 to present

Graduate Student Dissertation Committees

Rose Koch (chair – Graduated August 2005)
Larry Torcello (chair – Graduated April 2006)
Mark Ninswonger (chair from 2006-2009)
Todd Bindig (chair – Graduated May 2006)
Andrea Ott (chair) – Graduated May 2010
Adam Taylor (chair) Graduate September 2014
Yuichi Minemura (Chair) Ongoing
Catherine Nolan (Chair) – defended Summer 2015
Jake Monaghan (Chair) ongoing
Rob Kelly (Chair) ongoing
Meghan Roehl (Defended May 2, 2016)
David Kaspar (Graduated October 2003)
George Backen (Graduated August 2005)
Mark Spencer (Passed Spring 2012)
Elisa Ruhl (Graduated 2010)
Clint Dowland (Chair – ongoing)
Jelena Krgovic (Defended April 2016)

Master's Theses

Nick Lane (Spring 2005)
Chris Barlow (Spring 2005)
Alisa Wandzilak (Summer 2007)
Krystyl Newell (Spring 2011)

Grants

Applied for \$1.25 million grant from the Templeton Foundation
Title: (29450) Causality, Persistence and Resurrection
Core Funding Area: Philosophy and Theology
Project Co-Leader: Neil Williams
Preliminary Decision Rejected May 23, 2011

Philosophical Associations

American Philosophical Association
Creighton Club: The New York State Philosophical Association
Society for Christian Philosophers
American Catholic Philosophical Association
Association for Practical and Professional Ethics

2002-2003 Department Committee Work

Progress and Evaluation Committee
Library Committee
Qualifying Examinations Committee

2003-2004

Placement Officer Committee (chair)
Colloquium Committee (chair)
Search Committee
Executive Committee
Graduate Examinations Grader

2004-2005

Admissions Committee
Graduate Examinations Committee
Executive Committee

2005-2006

Admissions Committee
Library Committee
Graduate Student Teaching Award Committee
Romanell Chair (Lowe) Committee

2006-2007

Placement Committee
Library Committee
Progress and Evaluation Committee

2007-2008

Director of Graduate Studies
Executive Committee
Admissions (Chair)
Placement Committee
Library Committee
Course Committee – Bioethics

2008-2009

Director of Graduate Studies
Executive Committee
Curriculum Committee
Admissions Committee
Progress and Evaluation Committee
Placement Committee
Course Committee - Bioethics
Graduate Affairs Committee
Hourani Lectures (John Fischer) Organizer

2009-2010

Director of Graduate Studies
Curriculum Committee
Admissions Committee
Progress and Evaluation Committee
Placement Committee
Course Committee - Bioethics
Graduate Affairs Committee

2010-2011

Chair of Department

2011-2012

Chair of Department
Search Committee for Early Modern Philosophy
Gender Committee
Organizer of Friday Lunchtime Philosophy Department Talks
Editor of the *NousLetter* (Department magazine for alumni)

2012-2013

Chair of Department
Editor of the *NousLetter* (Department magazine for alumni)
Organizer of Friday Lunchtime Philosophy Department Talks

2014-2015

Chair of Department
Editor of *NousLetter*
Organizer of Weekly Regents' Lectures
Chair of Political Philosophy Search

2015-2016

Chair of Department
Regents Lecturer Organizers
Graduate School Dissertation Prize Committee
Executive Committee

2016-2017

On leave

Public Service

Videotape Interview with High School Students at Williamsville North for C-Span project on the Science and Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research - Fall 2007

Delivered talk “How to Respond to Some Common Abortion Arguments” at St. Theresa’s Roman Catholic Church March 21, 2012

Delivered talk “How to Respond to Some Common Abortion Arguments” at St John the Baptist Roman Catholic Church on May 24, 2012

Participated in an abortion debates sponsored by the UB Students for Life and the UB undergraduate Philosophy Club April 5, 2012

Interview on Public Radio August 2015 about PANTC reading group and Boorse vs. Wakefield debates at the summer PANTC conference

University Service

Advisor to Health Sciences Librarian Renee Bush on Bioethical book purchases - Spring 2007-Fall 2008

2012-2015 Organizer of philosophy department run debates on the existence of God, vegetarianism, abortion, evolution and moral realism, existence of the soul, free will and moral responsibility, biological enhancements

Kurtz Lectures. Organizers. Biannual lectures on Naturalism in memory of Paul Kurtz

Graduate School Dissertation Prize Committee for Education and Social Sciences. Fall 2015

Summer School Teaching

Social and Ethical Values in Medicine Phi 337 taught every Summer 2002-2009

Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics – UB Ontology Workshop July 2009

References

1. Jeff McMahan
White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy
University of Oxford
Corpus Christi College
Oxford OX1 4JF
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Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
26 Nichol Avenue
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2882
Phone: (732) 932-9861 x155

2. Lynne Baker
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy.
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Email lrbaker@philos.umass.edu
Mail: Department of Philosophy
352 Bartlett Hall
University of Massachusetts
130 Hicks Way
Amherst, MA 01003-9269
Phone 413 545 2330

3. Eric Olson.
Professor of Philosophy.
University of Sheffield.
Email e.olson@sheffield.ac.uk
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield
45 Victoria Street, Sheffield S3 7QB UK
Tel. +44 (0)114 222 0591

4. Patrick Lee.
John N. and Jamie D. McAleer Professor of Bioethics
Franciscan University at Steubenville
Email patricklee6@comcast.net
Franciscan University of Steubenville
1235 University Boulevard
Steubenville, OH 43952

5. John Martin Fischer.
Professor and Chair of Philosophy Department.
University of California at Riverside
email John.Fischer@ucr.edu
Department of Philosophy
HMNSS Building, Room 1604
900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA 92521
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(951) 827-1503 Message Phone

6. Jason Eberl
Jason T. Eberl, Ph.D.
Semler Endowed Chair for Medical Ethics
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