**An Alternative to the Rational Substance Pro-Life View**

**Introduction**

Most prominent pro-lifers (Lee, Kaczor, Beckwith, George, Tollefsen, Eberl) defend a *Rational Substance View* in which all human beings are persons that belong to a kind of substance that is essentially rational. Even mindless fetuses and the severely brain damaged are members of that kind in virtue of a root or radical rational nature and that is what makes it as wrong to kill them as it is to end the reader’s life. The view is alleged to be immune to the familiar reductios of potentiality because bestowing the capacity to develop into a rational person upon entities that otherwise would not isn’t an identity-preserving enhancement but substantial change.

My critique of the Rational Substance View is that it’s bad biology and questionable metaphysics as rational capacities aren’t essential and their loss or gain doesn’t constitute substantial change. For example, removing unexpressed genes in an early embryo that are necessary for rational development do not end the life and existence of the embryo, even if they frustrate the developmental trajectory. I’ll contend that rational development is a contingent rather than essential trait. The Rational Substance View, as it presently stands, might not be able to escape all of the various reductios of potential, especially those involving the early embryo’s totipotent cells or McMahan’s hypothetical language learning dogs. I’ll also explore the possibility that understanding human beings as essentially possessing rationality *and* animality can produce some metaphysical puzzles as these traits would appear to diverge in the famous (upper) brain transplants that leave behind mindless animals. Most advocates of the Rational Substance View favor a hylomorphic metaphysic which can preserve the unity of psychological and biological capacities in the transplant thought experiment. However, one hylomorphic approach will do so in a way that involves some dubious metaphysics parenting some bad biology as human animals will pop in and out of existence with the loss and gain of a cerebrum. This problematic interpretation of the rational animal being transplanted with their cerebra receives some support from the postmortem commitments of a Hylomorphic Survivalist metaphysic that allows that rational *animals* could persist even when their souls weren’t configuring living bodies engaged in life processes.

I’ll instead recommend to pro-lifers the *Healthy Development Account* where fetuses are contingently rational and the morally relevant potential is that of healthy development. The key idea is that mindless human beings have interests in healthy development, the satisfaction of which results in sophisticated, rational, reflective mental lives capable of unrivalled levels of well-being. This will bestow upon them great moral status. The resulting rational mental operations are realizations of contingent functions (Wakefield, Boorse) rather than expressions of the soul’s essence (Aristotle, Aquinas). The fewer contentious metaphysical commitments of the Healthy Development Account give it some practical or dialectical, if not “politically liberal” advantages over the Rational Substance View. The reductios of potentiality plaguing many other pro-life approaches are circumvented by the Healthy Development Account without a controversial metaphysics of substantial change but on the grounds that they all involve creatures that aren’t unhealthy if they don’t become persons.

**Part I: The Pro-Life Rational Substance View**

**Rational Capacities**

 The Rational Substance View maintains that every human being is a rational animal.[[1]](#footnote-1) If an animal lacks a root or radical capacity for rationality, then it is not a human being. It could have human parents but not be human because it is lacking a rational nature.[[2]](#footnote-2) The view that we are rational animals can be traced back to Aristotle and the claim that persons are substances with a rational nature is found in Boethius and Aquinas. A substance will be a persisting entity that meets certain independence or unity considerations.[[3]](#footnote-3) Its nature will account for its various properties and powers (Beckwith 2004, 2009; Moreland and Rae).

Fetuses are rational human animals because of their root capacity for rationality. Think of this as a second-order capacity akin to being able to speak a language or run a marathon that one can’t right now speak or run but can with training (Lee 2017, 55). The capacity is untapped. But it is part of our nature. Every human being, including our embryos have it, while puppies and adult dogs do not. The view avoids the standard reductios of potential by insisting the acquisition of rationality is not a potential of an existing creature to acquire new properties but would involve substantial change. So Tooley’s kitten (1972) injected with a serum enabling it to develop into a person does not pose a problem rendering it such that every kitten must be regarded by pro-lifers with the esteem that they had reserved for human fetuses because of their potential. The Rational Substance Pro-Life View will maintain that fetuses have great moral status because of their ability to later actualize their root capacity for rationality. The kitten doesn’t have that nature prior to the injection and so is not harmed by not becoming a feline that is self-conscious, capable of acting in a rationally moral manner etc. Likewise, for any other of the reductios on offer involving gametes that can be altered to parthenogenically develop into persons, or cells becoming clones of persons, or other differentiated or pluripotent cells becoming totipotent and giving rise to persons.[[4]](#footnote-4) They all involve substantial change and don’t undermine the Rational Substance View that the active or intrinsic potential of the human fetus to develop its mental capacities is morally significant. We are under no duty to protect or promote such *potential persons* presented in the alleged reductios as they are not *persons with potential* but numerically distinct from the subsequent persons derived from them.

The possessing of this rational capacity is the basis of our fundamental right to life. It is why we are the subjects of basic rights (Lee 2017). The alternative is that we obtain rights after undergoing certain mental developments. But development is a matter of degree, not kind. The advocates of the Rational Substance View insist that it would be arbitrary to claim any particular degree of rationality, moral agency, self-consciousness of past and future would be decisive. It would undermine the equality of persons as we have such capacities to different degrees depending upon our developmental stage, while even our healthy adults are not equally rational, autonomous, free, reflective, self-conscious, responsible etc.

There is admittedly something intuitively appealing and reassuring about the equality of every human. The advocates of the Rational Substance View claim that it is a root capacity for rationality that distinguishes our nature from that of other kinds of creatures. We always have it as it is essential. But we have rational capacities to different degrees so even if manifestation of the capacity is a matter of degree we can ignore, don’t we possess the root capacity to different degrees? Two human beings in identical circumstances won’t end up equally rational. Therefore, don’t humans have moral status to different degrees? (Stretton 2004, 270) The response of Lee (2004, 2007) and Beckwith (2004, 2011) is that it is not the capacity that matters but being a member of the kind. And that kind membership doesn’t come in degrees. We are all human. We are not human to different extent. Assuming that is true, is it a cheat?

**Bad Biology**

Why do all humans belong to the same morally relevant kind? Why don’t we distinguish different kinds of beings, and restrict “human” to the rational, including those with at least the genetic potential for rationality and excluding those without it? Why are the anencephalic considered humans in the Aristotelian sense, especially if their condition is due to missing genes rather than the environment stymied development? Are the devotees of the Rational Substance View implicitly and illegitimately helping themselves to other accounts of species (maybe reproductive community or historical lineage) to say these are defective humans? Are they entitled to that? I suspect that they are borrowing from alternative account of species when they accept some humans as defective but still essentially rational. More importantly, are they justified insinsitng to insist that the defective individuals are essentially rational rather than contingently rational? I don’t see why we should favor classifying them as having the essential root rationality as opposed to the contingent rationality which includes the anencephalic. The latter could become rational if genes that had been knocked out or mutated were replaced, or added if they would have been missing from the start, or they could just become rational if they receive the much-discussed cerebrum transplant.

But here is where the dubious biology arises – or further dubious biology arises if one thinks the rational animal account of our species is suspect in the light of modern biology’s move to historicizing species as not universals with instances but individuals with members (Hull).[[5]](#footnote-5) Imagine that one gene is necessary but not sufficient for rational development. (If such genes are likely redundant, then add whatever number is necessary for rational development.) Assume before they are expressed, they are removed in utero. That is substantial change as there is no (possible nearby) environment in which the fetus will become rational with that genetic makeup. Replacing the genes would be further substantial change. However, such gene therapy isn’t so existentially significant. It is hard to believe that anything is cycling in and out of existence or being replaced by doppelgangers. If a living being ceases to exist, then it has died as death involves ceasing to instantiate life processes (Hershenov, 2019). But nothing seems to have died when unexpressed genes are removed. The same cell is engaged in the metabolic and homeostatic processes characteristic of life. Nor does it seem that an organism (a chimp) has gone out of existence and new essentially rational animal (one of us) has come into existence when a human cerebrum is put into a non-human skull. A non-rejected organ shouldn’t destroy the recipient. There is not even a new developmental sequence when an adult chimp receives an organ transplant. Nevertheless, Beckwith (2004, 43) concludes that the transplant is metaphysically akin to the fusion of the sperm and egg that produces a new entity and the demise of the gametes.

I have suggested that the Rational Substance View seems to accept a biology that is dubious. But maybe the Rational Substance View is not committed to such willy-nilly substantial change as unexpressed genes necessary for rationality are added or subtracted resulting in new organisms.

Lee counters:

But what makes an individual human being and determines her nature is not centrally the genome in her cells but the possession of a nature that confers certain basic power namely, rational power, although the realizations of these power may require time and internal development. So, if a being doesn’t possess a radical capacity for rational operation, then it would not be a human being (2017, 62).

The latter makes one wonder about the relationship between genes and natures.[[6]](#footnote-6) One would think that we wouldn’t have the nature we do if we didn’t have many of the genes we did. A fetus missing human genes from the start might not be human. But what is the criterion for being a rational animal with the rationality blocked rather than missing? Is it just the potential to develop if the environment is supportive? Or is there a hylomorphic form that configures matter and produces genes and does so in a way that the same nature could exist with (somewhat) different genes? But what is the relationship between genes, forms, and nature? Surely, too much loss of genes will mean a different form and nature in type as well as token. Or at least that will be so if too many genes are missing at the start.

The *Rational Substance View* entails that any creature which is rational is essentially rational. So, if anencephalic *humans* were cured and belatedly grew brains, then they were always rational beings. Condic (2017) seems to think we should speak of defects in the anencephalic rather than their not being one of us; I agree, but I would still insist that they are contingently rational. She believes there is a developmental telos to growing a nervous system, a neural component coming later. So, the lack of the neural component means a defect in that process.[[7]](#footnote-7) But what makes it a *necessary* rationality rather than contingent rationality? An argument similarly structured could show that we are essentially sighted as a visual cortex could be built but eyes are missing.

If some entities missing the genes required for rationality to be expressed can acquire those genes without substantial change, then why can’t Tooley’s kitten or a Tooley-inspired chimp or a Tooley version of Cro-Magnon man contingently acquire the genes without undergoing substantial change, pace the Rational Substance View? Is the difference that they were not going down the developmental path that the anencephalic was? It seems that we are being asked to construe the change in telos towards developing rationality as substantial change. But is this telos essential or contingent? Modern biologists, or philosophers of biology more concerned with modal distinctions, would say it is contingent. Species individuation will depend upon sexual reproduction or evolutionary lineages, not rationality. Moreover, even species membership will not be essential (LaPorte). Creatures can switch species when populations split, lab made organisms could lack species (Hull), or species membership could be determined by future trends (as one hybrid doesn’t make a species).

Aristotelian-influenced readers may share Oderberg’s skepticism of such historical species taxonomies: “The more general worry about all phylogenetic concepts is why anyone should want to mix classification with origin” (2014, 24). However, my claim is just that rationality is contingent even if historicizing taxonomies is as misguided as categorizing helium and hydrogen by the time at which they came into existence after the Big Bang (Oderberg 2014, 24). Why isn’t the failure to develop rationality as contingent a failure as not developing eyes or becoming infertile? We aren’t essentially sighted or fertile, so why claim that we are essentially rational? The Rational Substance View shouldn’t appeal to the uniqueness of our cognitive skills. Why can’t a unique trait be contingent? Surely, human beings have some traits that no other species does besides rationality. One can imagine the possibility that we were the only sighted species. Would we be sighted animals instead of, or in addition to, being rational animals? Surely not. Perhaps the essentiality of rationality is due not just to its uniqueness but its pervasive role in brain structures and, more importantly, our abilities and behaviors which are not matched by our sight. I won’t pursue this possibility.

The literature on the etiological conception of function will accept that we could evolve to be nonrational without speciation occurring. Our rationality is contingent as are many of our other selected functions (Boorse 2002; Wakefield 2005). Plantinga’s (1993) proffered reductio of naturalist accounts of function will not embarrass most naturalists. (Boorse 2002, 93-95; Levin 1997). Imagine non-Aryans are given an injection that makes them less rational and any Non-Aryan killed if they are not injected. Over time, the injection keeps the non-Aryans alive and reproducing. Their mental changes are like camouflage saving some moths and not others without the coloring. Earlier generations of diminished rationality explain the presence of later human beings with similar mental capacities and so is the proper function. Later non-Aryans exist with such limited cognitive abilities because such limitations kept their ancestors alive long enough to reproduce and pass on those life preserving traits.

Even if the genes for rationality are present, it isn’t clear that creatures possessing them are human beings with elevated moral status. Consider McMahan’s fictional dogs that if we were to interact with them and train and educate them for the hours each day in a manner comparable to what we do in the education of our own young, they would become language comprehending persons. When Stretton (2004, 280-281) broached this possibility, Lee speculated that perhaps we were so obligated for the dogs had great moral status (2004, 95). This is intuitively the wrong answer. The lesson McMahan draws is that intrinsic or active potential doesn’t matter for moral status. It wouldn’t be easy to accord such potential to human children but not McMahan’s puppies. But it seems implausible that we have a duty to develop the language and reasoning skills of those dogs despite their identity with a post-training canine person. I agree, but the additional lesson that I want to draw here is that rationality is contingent as the dogs are not essentially rational as the genetic capabilities are insufficient. Assuming the dogs’ genes for rationality are separate from other manifested capacities, they are like junk DNA that are contingent possessions. Moreover, the dogs are not even unhealthy when their rational potential is not elicited, unlike the case of human young who are neglected or injured and never come to exercise linguistic or rational capabilities.[[8]](#footnote-8) The canine capacities for language learning were neither selected for adaptive advantages (Wakefield 2005) nor contributed in the past to survival and reproduction of the dogs’ ancestors (Boorse 2002). So, they are not unhealthy when left unable to comprehend a lecture on this subject. The education of McMahan’s dogs should not become a cause célèbre for animal rights activists taken all the way to the US Supreme Court. The case of the Amish refusing schooling, Yoder v. Wisconsin, is not here a relevant legal precedent for deciding a future PETA vs. PTA.

There might also be a problem for the Rational Substance View posed by the first two or four cells of the early embryo being totipotent. If the other totipotent cells were destroyed, the remaining could give rise to a baby. However, it can’t be the same baby that four celled embryo would give rise to as that would make the embryo identical to what was earlier one of its parts. Likewise, if the cell had been removed and placed in another womb, the other totipotent cells preserved, the removed cell would be identical to the resulting baby, distinct from the baby growing in the first womb. If so, would not the failure to remove this cell leave a human being’s potential unrealized? Yet we surely don’t a duty to further their rational potential. If rationality is essential, we would then be in the odd position of either welcoming or not furthering the expression of a totipotent cells’ essence. If rationality is a contingent capacity, our inaction is not preventing the expression of rational being’s nature. Or will it be countered that the transformation from embryo part to a one-celled embryo a substantial change? It is by no means obvious that eliciting the totipotency of the early embryonic cell is substantial change but the development of the zygote is not. Could removing embryonic parts external to the boundary of a cell really destroy that cell?

**The Dubious Metaphysics of Hybrid Views of Personal Identity**

The personal identity literature divides views mostly into those that claim that some sort of psychology (rationality, self-consciousness, mental continuity, agency etc.) is essential and those that hold it is not necessary for our persistence (Olson 1997). The problems for the first view is that it looks like we never could have been fetuses since they lack (rationality etc.) It also means that none of us could lapse into an irreversible coma but instead would then go out of existence for psychology is essential to us. The question then becomes what is the entity located in the coma and what is it that was a mindless fetus? Assuming fetal animals didn’t cease to exist with the growth of a brain, and a new animal did not pop into existence with the loss of conscious capacities, then one and the same animal was there all along. This raises puzzles about the relationship of the person to the animal. If they are distinct, the infamous Problem of Too Many Thinkers rears its ugly head for if the person can use her brain to think so can the animal.[[9]](#footnote-9) If we identify animals and persons, then there is only one being that was once a fetus, then a thinker, and later a mindless vegetable after a stroke.

Alas, the identification of persons and animals with biological persistence conditions has the counterintuitive consequence that we aren’t transplanted when our cerebrum realizing rationality is but would stay behind as a cerebrumless mindless animals. So to the rescue of our intuitions comes the hybrid theorist (or cluster theorist or disjunctive theorist) who explains that either psychology (rationality) or biology (metabolism) is sufficient and neither is necessary for our persistence (Madden; Langford). This appears to give us the best of both worlds, no fetuses popping out of existence with the onset of thought or coming to exist co-located with a newly emerged person; Or if the animal body is destroyed but a functioning cerebrum is preserved, the person persists in virtue of their continued psychology. But like the claims of on-line dating personals, hybrid accounts of personal identity produce misleading first impressions.

The hybrid account is indeed too good to be true (Hershenov, 2020). What if the sufficient conditions are separated when a cerebrumless body is kept alive but a bodiless cerebrum continues to think? Which is the original? The original individual can’t be identical to both as that would violate the transitivity of identity as they are not identical to each other. To avoid such an unwelcome metaphysics, what is needed is a dominance condition that determines which feature trumps the other when it appears that their realizations diverge.[[10]](#footnote-10) The dominance condition will determine which post-transplant candidate is the original entity and which is a new or distinct being.

Many advocates of the Rational Substance View accept a hylomorphic conception of the person. Now imagine that a person’s torso is terribly damaged or cancerous, but there is available a good body belonging to a comatose person that can receive the transplant of the good cerebrum. The hylomorphic account of dominance might be that the person tries to realize her higher powers and so if the rationality can be realized in a functioning cerebrum transplant (Spencer 857-858), the ensouled person/animal goes with the cerebrum. Pruss holds a similar view writing “to survive the adult human needs either a functioning cerebrum or a functioning lower brain and when both survive in a separated form, the animal goes with the cerebrum rather than the lower brain, as that is more central to it” (2011, 24). Since the person is identical to the animal, the person has been transplanted even though it doesn’t instantiate biological life processes when cerebrum-size. Thus, if the transplanted cerebrum is functioning, the soul withdraws from the entire body and “drains” into the cerebrum. If thought can’t be realized in a detached organ, then the rational soul and the possessor remain in a coma due to the absence of a functioning cerebrum.[[11]](#footnote-11) I will not contest these soul “hydraulics,” just highlight that this again involves bad metaphysics spawning bad biology. There is bad biology involved in removing a cerebrum and transporting the now organ-size animal who is no longer alive[[12]](#footnote-12) but still an animal because of its soul’s capacities to configure a living body. One biological absurdity of the transplant process is that the removal of a cerebrum means that a new cerebrum-less animal pops into existence composed of the matter that was earlier a part of the now separated cerebrum-size animal. A second biological absurdity is that the previously comatose person in which the cerebrum is transplanted, will either come to coexist with the transplanted person (Eberl 2020) when it receives a cerebrum (the rational soul of the comatose coming to use the new cerebrum to produce thought), or the earlier comatose person will pop out of existence. That strikes me again as bad biology, parented by bad metaphysics (Hershenov 2020b, 2021).

Now the Rational Substance View, when construed in terms of a hylomorphic metaphysics, need not be committed to any of these bad metaphysical and biological views. It can just claim that we are rational animals who must always be alive and so will become mindless creatures in persistent vegetative states when our cerebra are removed even if the cerebra function and produce thought, at least after being transplanted, if not during the transport. Our soul gives us the power to regrow the cerebrum in a scientifically advanced future (Shewmon 1997, 73-74) just as we grew one as embryos, or reconfigure one when it is transplanted into our skull. Nevertheless, there is some pressure to resist this view on the Thomistic Survivalist view of the posthumous pre-resurrection afterlife where the animal exists disembodied in Purgatory in virtue of the soul’s existence and powers to configure matter in a living form (Eberl 2009; Stump 2003. 51-54; Oderberg 2007, 264-265; Thornton 2019). If a disembodied person is an animal in virtue of a radical capacity to engage in life processes if embodied, then why isn’t the person consisting of the detached cerebrum also an animal because of its radical capacity to configure a living body? [[13]](#footnote-13)

There is also pressure upon hylomorphic thinkers to accept the cerebrum transplant as the transplant of a human animal if one thinks the animal exists, reduced in size, without being alive in cases of high-level cervical spinal cord injuries or extreme Guillain-Barre syndrome where the human being thinks but doesn’t engage in life processes, perhaps having been reduced to the size of part of the brain (Moschella 2016, 283, 289, 293, 295; Eberl 2011: 52; Condic 2016). The presence of thought indicates the presence of the soul even in the absence of life processes. Condic writes of persons with damage that prevents the exercise of integrating biological processes

This results in a human being who only exercises a subset of their natural abilities and who is no longer able to exercise his capacity to function as an organism…So long as SCI patients exhibit brain function…there is reason to believe that the human soul (which is also the principle of the capacity for organismal integration) persists, and that such patients are therefore *alive* (Condic 2016, 268-269).

 This view requires a metaphysics of ensoulment and an essential rational “capacity that could not be produced by material forces working on their own” (Lee 2004, 95) that many citizens will not accept. The appeal of the approach will be greatly limited as it perhaps will run afoul of Rawlsian Public Reason (2005). Even if one says “so much the worse for Public Reason”, there is still an advantage dialectically to pro-lifers in not appealing to metaphysically contentious claims. So regardless of whether you think Public Reason allows such metaphysics into the abortion debate or should not in liberal political regimes (Shoemaker 2005), the view still demands some metaphysical commitments that my preferred Healthy Development Account does not.

I’ll argue in the second part of this paper that the pro-lifer can accept that rationality - and other impressive mental capacities - can be a contingent rather than essential to us. The reductios of potential believed to befall accounts that bestow elevated moral status on mindless and minimally minded humans in virtue of the mental capacities they will later manifest after considerable development can be avoided without an appeal to substantial change rather than identity preserving enhancement. A mainstream, naturalist, value-free account of health can do most of the philosophical heavy lifting. The Healthy Development Account requires only the soulless animalism of Olson and van Inwagen, life processes rather than mental processes being essential. Thus, there is a reason to prefer to what Toner calls *Latter-day Animalism* (van Inwagen, Olson) to *Original Animalism* (Aristotle, Aquinas). Perhaps the other costs of *Latter-day Animalism* can outweigh this.[[14]](#footnote-14) But all else being equal, the soul, even Non-Cartesian versions, will be a non-starter, with the naturalists and not welcomed in the public sphere by many non-naturalists.

**Part II. The Healthy Development Account**

**Health, Well-Being, and Moral Status**

According to the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on moral status “An entity has moral status if and only if it or its *interests* morally matter to some degree for the entity’s own sake, such that it can be wronged” (Jaworska and Tannenbaum (2013, 1). I believe that mindless fetuses and minimally minded neonates have considerable moral status. I’m quite dubious of claims that newborns and the unborn lack the interests required for the moral standing that warrants protecting their lives (Tooley 1972, 1983, 2009; Singer 1993; Devolder and Harris: 2007; Giublini and Minerva: 2013). Those maintaining such a position typically fail to recognize that *something can be in an individual’s interest* even if *that individual doesn’t take an interest in it*.[[15]](#footnote-15) For example, broccoli and other healthy foods are in children’s interests although often they’re not as interested in them as they are in sweets. What is in the interests of individuals need not be conscious or even accessible to their consciousness. It is in the unborn and newborn’s interest to survive even though they do not consciously desire to live on into the future - nor could they given their lack of the requisite conceptual apparatus.

My contention is that all living things have an interest in being healthy which involves not just health at the moment but healthy development, the two being intertwined. The living aren’t healthy at any time that their development is stymied and they then cease to make preparations for their growth and maintenance. And so every human potential person, even those who are too immature to have ever been conscious or are no longer conscious due to pathology, necessarily have a *prima facie* interest to live and develop in a healthy fashion.[[16]](#footnote-16) Their well-being when mindless just consists in their healthy functioning.[[17]](#footnote-17) And their healthy development will lay the foundation for their fuller flourishing when conscious.

Organisms differ from artifacts and non-living natural entities in their possession of interests and well-being. Artifacts such as cars don’t have an interest in oil except in the derivative sense that their operators want them lubricated. Nonliving mindless objects such as rocks can’t undergo fluctuations in well-being like mindless living creatures for only the latter can be said to become healthier/better off or sicker/worse off. Mindless objects without goals[[18]](#footnote-18) can’t be ascribed interests and without such ends there won’t be well-being, much less changes in well-being as they move closer or further from those goals.[[19]](#footnote-19) Non-living mindless entities cannot maintain or undergo changes in their well-being and thus don’t have an intrinsic welfare. It makes little sense to say a mountain or a hill is doing well or poorly. Mindless *living* beings, on the other hand, can undergo fluctuations in their well-being as their health improves or worsens. As living teleological systems they monitor themselves and their environments, respond and make internally-driven adjustments to acquire and maintain health (Somerholf 1950). In virtue of such results, we can state whether their lives are going well or not, whether they are flourishing or failing.

Understanding well-being in relation to flourishing that will provide continuity between the minded and mindless. Mindless plants, animals, and humans can all flourish. “Flourishing consists in the growth and development of the capacities of a living being” (Kraut 2007, 148). At times later in that development, the flourishing of human beings will involve the maturation and exercise of mental capacities. But earlier, when mindless, they could be flourishing in the appropriate way for their stage of development.

If the mindless do have interests, I don’t see what else other than health could be the basis of the interests and well-being of the non-conscious. The manner in which non-conscious organisms operate can’t be described as directed at anything else but survival and reproduction. They don’t have experiential states, they don’t have desires, they are not instantiating objective list goods like knowledge, truth, beauty, friendship, love, meaning, morality, and virtue. Their only “accomplishments” appear to be achieving health.[[20]](#footnote-20)

Even blades of grass can literally be said to thrive and thus have an intrinsic well-being and genuine interests in sunlight, moisture, and nutrient-rich soil. Despite having interests, such grass has a future that isn’t very valuable, so the interests of grass are given far less *moral* weight than those of sentient animals or human beings. Assuming that the degree of the harm of an entity’s death depends, at least, in part, upon the value and extent of the well-being that it loses out on, the grass is harmed very little by its death.Healthy human fetuses, on the other hand, have the potential to realize mental capacities of the utmost value that will enable them to flourish at unrivaled levels of well-being. Since a human being has an interest in developing into a creature of great value, the frustration of that interest allows humans at any stage of life to be harmed by their death or other deprivations to a degree that nonhuman organisms cannot.[[21]](#footnote-21) Since we are the kind of being that can reach such high levels of well-being, we have greater moral status than other creatures. Our great moral status and interest in maintaining it is why we are protected by a right to life. Non-human Creatures capable of far less well-being and thus with much lower moral status will lack such a right. While our moral status depends upon our being the *kind* of being capable of such great well-being when healthy, it doesn’t depend upon our always being able to reach such levels of well-being. For instance, late in life when we have very little time left due to a fatal pathology and thus little well-being left to obtain, our moral status doesn’t diminish and our right to life doesn’t vanish or decrease in stringency.[[22]](#footnote-22)

**An Interest in Healthy Development**

The morally relevant sense of potential in the mindless and minimally minded is determined by what constitutes healthy development. I’m assuming that the correct account of health will be a naturalist or objective one that invokes value-free notions of function and dysfunction (Boorse 2002).[[23]](#footnote-23) An organism will be healthy when its parts are functioning properly. They are functioning properly when they make the appropriate contribution for members of that reference class of males and females of certain ages to the goals of survival and reproduction (Boorse, 1977). Neither the determinations of appropriate contributions, the reference class, or the goals depend upon our values (Boorse 1997; Hershenov 2020a). Health doesn’t depend upon our values, so an interest in health won’t mean the pursuit of outcomes that depend upon and fluctuate with variations in societal values. It doesn’t affect the notion of morally relevant potential that I’m defending whether the correct notion of health depends upon understanding functions in terms of evolutionary adaptationist accounts like that favored by Jerry Wakefield (1992, 2005) or non-etiological accounts of function like that advocated by Christopher Boorse (1976, 1977, 2002).

While our best concepts of health are free from values (Boorse 1977; Hershenov 2020), our healthy development bears upon our well-being and moral status**.** Physical and mental health will enable human beings to experience a range of emotions and exercise a variety of cognitive skills unrivaled and more valuable than those of any other kind of living being. I don’t think it is controversial to conceive of our moral status being intimately connected to our mental capacities. This is not deriving an “ought” of our value from the “is” of our physical development. The claims of moral status and health are related but logically independent. Living beings thrive when they are healthy. When they are mindless, health is all there is to their well-being.[[24]](#footnote-24) Health is good for the mindless and the good is their interest.[[25]](#footnote-25) So, given their potential to obtain great levels of well-being when they develop in a healthy manner, that means they’ll be greatly harmed if deprived of that valuable future. It might help readers appreciate the value and well-being resulting from the activities that healthy human mental development makes possible if they consider the absence of health in those mentally disordered individuals suffering impairments recognized by the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* in love, sociability, empathy, conscience, desire, self-restraint, prudence, reason, learning, memory, or judgment (Wakefield 2005, 894).

Our healthy development makes possible levels of well-being unrivaled by other known creatures. So, if there is an unhealthy, cognitively impaired human fetus or infant and a healthy non-human animal with comparable manifested mental abilities (which includes the equal absence of mental life), they are not equally harmed by never becoming persons because it isn’t unhealthy for the non-human to be so mentally limited. Only human beings are unhealthy when they fail to develop into persons or cease to remain persons. Since the interests of the mindless are just in health and the minimally minded have consciously acquired only a few other non-health-oriented interests, it is only the human non-persons that have interests frustrated when they don’t develop minds characteristic of a person (self-consciousness, rationality, moral agency etc.). This explains the widely shared intuition that if we have only a single dose of a scarce serum that can make a congenitally cognitively impaired human being into a person or a healthy kitten (rabbit, oyster, dog etc.) into a person, the human being should receive the serum. The human has an interest in such healthy development, the kitten does not even if it can survive the change in developmental trajectory. I don’t deny that both will *later* enjoy the benefits of personhood. My point is that when mindless or minimally minded, it is only human beings that have interests in developing the rational mind of a person.

It shouldn’t be thought that an interest in health is only an interest in *present* health. In fact, it makes little sense to speak of an interest solely in momentary health since human beings are not only typically disposed towards healthy development in the future but presently preparing their bodies for those future changes. Present health can’t be coherently described without understanding future healthy development. So, readers shouldn’t accept my claim that the mindless now have interests in being healthy but resist recognizing that they have an interest in their future healthy mental development. Mindless human embryos presently have interests in the very future made possible by the exercise of their mature mental faculties. It other words, they would now be unhealthy if their embryonic brains or neural tubes were being configured in a way that would leave them unable to later engage in typical adolescent and adult forms of reasoning and feeling.

It is important to highlight that it isn’t sufficient for a mindless entity to be numerically identical to a future being to presently have an interest in that being’s later welfare (Hershenov 2011). The future good must be in the mindless being’s interest when it is mindless. This distinguishes the Healthy Development Account of potential from other accounts that just ascribe moral significance on the basis of *future* property acquisitions or capacity actualizations or later interests. But the potential of a fetus to be a person on those accounts will thus be like the potential of a toddler to be a president. As Benn (1973) and Feinberg (1986) observe, a potential president doesn’t have the rights of an actual president. This toddler is oblivious of ever becoming the president and may never even become interested in obtaining the presidency. Such future contingencies make it difficult to see why that future now matters for a being’s present moral status and privileges. I am instead stressing the present and continuing interest in health. The mindless presently have an interest in a healthy life. It isn’t that there is something good about the future (like being the president) that *might* later become good for them but currently is not in their interest. Rather, it is the case that a healthy life is good for them now and their interest in health is an interest in ongoing health that includes their future healthy development. The basis for their future health is their present healthy development as structures and properties are prepared and sustained for their role in future healthy mental functioning.

**The Costs of Denying the Existence of Unexperienced Interests**

The only basis that I can see for ascribing interests to the mindless is to appeal to the good realized by their healthy development for entities of their kind. I expect a significant number of readers will be skeptical of the mindless having interests or well-being. Feinberg likely captures their sentiments writing: “Without awareness, expectation, belief, desire, aim, and purpose, a being can have no interests; without interests he cannot be benefitted; without the capacity to be a beneficiary, he can have no rights” (Feinberg 1974, 51).[[26]](#footnote-26) However, given the costs of their commitments in accounting for rights and interests as Feinberg does, they might want to reconsider.

If philosophers don’t accept that non-sentient beings can have welfare and interests then they won’t be able to explain the harms or benefits of themselves losing or gaining consciousness. The standard counterfactual comparative account determines whether an event has harmed or benefitted you by measuring your well-being due to the actual event and comparing it with your well-being if the event in question had not occurred. You are in a harmed state if the event produces a drop in well-being from what would have been the case, a beneficial state if it brings a rise in your well-being. Thus, if the mindless don’t have any level of well-being then we can’t explain why it is a harm to lapse into a coma and why the harm occurs *when* one is in the coma. Nor can we make sense of why it would be beneficial for someone to come out of coma or, better yet, be in their interest to become conscious for the first time.[[27]](#footnote-27) In order for that change to be a benefit, the mindless condition must be compared with the conscious state. So, to make sense of seemingly obvious harms and benefits, we must allow that the mindless have well-being, even if it is zero or negative. Their well-being can’t be measured by experiential states or desire satisfaction for they have none. Yet, if something would be good for them, then we can say it is in their interest. Thus, it is wrong to insist that only the conscious can be harmed. Consciousness makes possible pain, not harm. Entities can be harmed by not becoming conscious. Individuals that are supposed to be conscious, but aren’t, can be harmed to degrees not reached by living creatures not designed to develop consciousness.

Being unable to account for the benefits and harms of gaining and losing consciousness is not the only cost of denying well-being to the mindless. It seems that if one denies the mindless possess longstanding interests before the onset of consciousness then, ironically, one can’t even make sense of the interests of the minimally conscious in avoiding pain. Many of the defenders of aborting the mindless and even killing the minimally minded infant are quick to reassure readers that the minimally minded have an interest and right against suffering torments (Tooley, Singer, Giubilini and Minerva). So, it is morally acceptable to kill infants but not inflict torments upon them. Their killing is permissible because they lack a conception of themselves as persisting across time and thus can’t consciously express or even possess an interest in continuing to exist. However, it is not at all clear to me that these advocates of infanticide can maintain it is wrong to inflict pain upon those merely sentient creatures that they believe it is permissible to kill the minimally minded. Infants lack the concepts to desire themselves being pain-free in the future and to judge that better than remaining in pain. Given that it is surely in their interest not to so suffer, we can conclude that they can have interests that they can’t conceptualize.

Not only do the minimally conscious have an interest in avoiding torture, but they have this interest before they even become conscious. Imagine that the premature newborn who has not been conscious at or before T1 is conscious and pain-free at T2, and in pain the following day at T3. The creature’s interest and right to not to have pain inflicted doesn’t just emerge when the newborn is in pain at T3 but is surely there at T2,the day before the pain is suffered. It seems quite odd to claim that newborns only have an interest in pain avoidance when they are in pain. It would seem that they have an interest at T2 in avoiding pain at T3. Although they are conscious at T2, they are not then aware or capable of conceptualizing their interest in being pain free at T3. So the interest in pain relief need not be conscious and thus could exist at T1 before the human being became conscious. Thus, possession of that interest in pain avoidance doesn’t require the onset of consciousness but merely the potential to suffer pain in the future.

Let’s turn now to another debit in the ledger of those denying interests to the mindless. If readers maintain well-being depends upon conscious interests, then a minded being only has interests of which she is aware or could immediately access. Therefore, the conceptually limited newborn who is unaware that she needs some surgical procedure to avoid a painless death would not have an interest in that treatment. She can’t have an interest in life saving surgery because she can neither conceptualize herself persisting through time nor dying from a disease. Likewise, if the surgery would prevent a nonfatal cognitive impairment that is so severe that she will never be capable of having a conscious interest opposed to her impaired condition. Nevertheless, it seems very implausible to claim that the infant lacks an interest in her health being preserved because she isn’t consciously aware that is in her interest. That said, if consciousness of the interest in health isn’t required for the neonate to possess it, then that interest should exist earlier in the fetus before there was any consciousness at all.

**Avoiding Standard Reductios of Potential’s Moral Significance**

It is frequently claimed that moral appeals to potential are susceptible to refutation by *reductio* for an embarrassing abundance of entities have the potential to become persons. Potential is condemned as too “promiscuous” a concept (Feinberg 1974; Lizza 2007, 2010). And it certainly is when viewed through the lens of conceptual possibility, metaphysical possibility, or even physical possibility. For example, it may be physically, or at least metaphysically possible, to induce isolated human gametes to undergo parthenogenesis and grow into a person. It may be physically and metaphysically possible for a totipotent cell of an early embryo to be removed and induced to behave like a normal human zygote, while preserving the identity of that cell with the resulting child(Singer and Sagan 2007; Steir and Schono-Seifert 2013). Perhaps direct nuclear reprogramming is identity preserving as Neaves and Magill conjecture (2009).[[28]](#footnote-28) Maybe cloning of somatic cells can occur in ways that are identity preserving. Nevertheless, we surely aren’t under any moral obligation to further such potential.

To claim such possibilities are reductios of potentiality is not to appreciate the potential of potentiality arguments (Hershenov and Hershenov 2017). The cottage industry producing anti-potential products has been reinventing a broken wheel. If not the first, the most famous critique of potential was penned by Michael Tooley. He started this cottage industry not in his Silicon Valley garage but at Stanford University. He argued that if potential mattered morally then a kitten injected with a serum that gave it the potential to become a person would warrant moral protection similar to that which pro-lifers insist the human fetus is entitled. My response is that since the kitten would not be malfunctioning (unhealthy) if it didn’t so develop, it wouldn’t be wronged if it was not injected or the serum was neutralized before the drug transformed the feline’s anatomical structures and functions. The kitten’s interests are those due to its healthy development (functioning properly) *and* whatever else it has come to consciously desire. It is not unhealthy for the kitten to fail to develop into a person and since it also does not consciously desire the change, so it has no interest in such development.[[29]](#footnote-29)

The Healthy Development Account doesn’t even have to rely upon the standard response of the defenders of the pro-life Rational Substance View which is to distinguish the *identity preserving potential* of an individual to reach a later stage of itself from the looser sense of the potential of one entity to undergo substantial change and bring into existence a distinct (*non-identical*) entity (Lee 1997, Kaczor 2011, Beckwith 2007; Tollefsen and George 2011; Eberl 2014). They insist that the kitten doesn’t have the potential to become rational so it wouldn’t be harmed by the absence of the serum. The serum would not have enhanced them but brought about their replacement. One of the strengths of the Healthy Development Account is that it’s impervious to concerns about substantial change in kittens due to enhancing serums. Even if they will persist through the acquisition of personhood, they aren’t unhealthy if they don’t receive the serum and thus don’t have an interest in the serum when mindless or minimally minded. McMahan’s dogs are not unhealthy if they don’t learn language. This makes them unlike human children that are neglected by their guardians. The absence of verbal skills in the latter is a pathology. The Healthy Development Account is also unfazed by the skin cell in the cloning case having its identity preserved in the process. Such development isn’t the healthy functioning of a skin cell. Similarly, if the first four cells of an early embryo are totipotent, then there would not be any moral pressure to split the embryo into four people to maximize their potential as Harris and Devolder speculate**.**[[30]](#footnote-30)Those cells already have a role in the developing embryo even if they are not yet fully differentiated. Even if cloning were to be accomplished in a way that was identity preserving, the cell initially doesn’t have an interest in functioning in a manner other than how healthy skin cells functions. Therefore, no interest gets frustrated and no harm to the cell occurs when cloning doesn’t take place. Likewise, for induced parthenogenesis, even if it is identity preserving. And if unrestricted composition is true, the egg and sperm swimming towards it in the fallopian tube would compose a scattered object with the intrinsic or active power in that environment to develop and later manifest its rationality. But a scattered object is not alive and so, according to the Health Development Account, doesn’t have interests. Ergo, the potential of any cells other than the zygote to become a person is morally irrelevant.

**Conclusion**

 Pro-lifers need only accept that healthy development provides the morally relevant potential. They need not climb out on any thin metaphysical limbs and insist we are essentially rational. It suffices that if we are rational when we are healthy. The young human being’s interests in realizing that potential health, however improbable or passive, bestows upon it considerable moral status and distinguishes it from all other kinds of potential rational persons.[[31]](#footnote-31)

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**Metaphysics and the Future-Like-Ours Argument against Abortion**

Eric Vogelstein Forthcoming in the

*Journal of Ethics*

Vogelstein, Eric. 2016, “Metaphysics and the Future-like-ours Argument Against Abortion” *Journal*

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1. “Being rational is having the natural capacity for conceptual thought and free choice” (Lee 2004, 256). Lee and George (2007, 52-65) offer a more detailed account. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. George and Tollefsen (2011) hypothesize that some miscarried fetuses were so chromosomally deficient that they were not human. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Koslicki (2018) for reasons to favor a unity over independence criterion for substances. Beckwith (2004, 32) draws upon Norris Clarke’s account of substance which includes conditions of independence as well as unity. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Dean Stretton (2000, 2004) for the challenge that rationality is a contingent function and Lee’s (2004, 2007) replies that Stretton begs the question against the rational substance view. Stretton presses similar complaints against Beckwith (2008). Stretton serves as a useful gadfly for the Rational Substance View as the proponents clarify and focus their views in response to his challenge. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. But see Oderberg’s (2007) interesting critique of modern biological taxonomies and a defense of the traditional essentialist, morphological, metaphysical model of species. There is always the danger that devotees of the Rational Substance View and their critics, like myself, just mean different things by “species” and so are talking past each other. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. In comments on this paper, Allison Thornton expressed the worry modern genetic biology and hylomorphism are two incompatible frameworks and thus it is a mistake to ask the defender of hylomorphism to spell out the theory’s commitments in genetic terms. There is something to this objection, one shouldn’t demand that hylomorphism be reduced to and explained fully in the concepts and principles of contemporary biology. However, both contemporary biology and hylomorphism are try to give accounts of when we come into and go out of existence. There are hylomorphic accounts of fertilization (Condic 2016, Eberl 2014; Condic and Condic 2018) and hylomorphic accounts of brain death and circulatory-respiratory death (Condic 2016, 2017; Shewmon 1985, 1997; Spencer 2010; Eberl 2020). So, the traditions are in conversation and trying to explain the same facts of persistence. Ergo, it seems fair to ask what biological changes are compatible and incompatible with our origins and continued existence as rational beings. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. She contrasts this with a zombie virus that reanimates dead human beings but the resulting telos is that of a Walking Dead-like zombie and not the rational human being that had left the corpse (2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Another lesson to be drawn is that the potential that matters is what will come from healthy development in one’s design environment, not an intrinsic potential due to one’s genome that has no functions in natural history [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See Olson (2003) for the epistemic problems raised by co-located thinkers, see Hershenov and Taylor (2017) for the moral puzzles. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Even a dominance condition is toxic as it violates the only x and y rule (Hawley, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Shewmon entertains the possibility that both the transplanted brain and the resulting brainless organism are both human beings with claims to be the original person Smith, but leaves it unresolved, relieved to say “Fortunately, however for all practical purposes, the whole issue is moot…the hypothetical scenario of the thought is irrelevant …brain destruction occurs in situ…and which of the two living entities is Smith never arises” (1997, 70-71.) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Organs aren’t alive as they lack the integration, self-maintenance, and direction of an organism (Olson 1997: 132). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Does the supernaturalism of the survivalist account limit the lessons that can be extended to the transplant scenario? [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See Rose and David Hershenov’s (2017) for the costs and an attempt lower or to tolerate them.. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. This distinction is found in Tom Regan (1982). The idea of interests in the mindless might be more popular with those scholars working in environmental ethics than the other branches of applied ethics. Our intellectual chauvinism and focus on human concerns may blind us to well-being in mindless organisms (Paul Taylor: 1986). Once we recognize such flourishing in non-human life forms, it will be easier to appreciate it in mindless humans. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. This interest can later be overridden by the emergence of conscious concerns (Hershenov and Hershenov 2016; 2017, 40). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Kraut also seems to understand flourishing in the mindless just consists of healthy functions (2007, 5). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. These goals needn’t be consciously chosen ends. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. It’s revealing to observe the structural similarities between health and well-being. Diseased plants and animals are described as failing and the healthy as flourishing. We likewise describe conscious organisms who undergo significant drops in well-being as doing poorly and those whose well-being greatly increases as their thriving. That well-being is contrasted with ill-being (Kagan) further suggests a connection between health and well-being. This supports my contention that it is not metaphorical to claim that mindless organisms can thrive. Even when mindless, it is good for a plant or fetus to be healthy. The causes and constituents of their flourishing are in their interest. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See Boorse’s definitions of health (1977, 1997). Hershenov (2020) offers a naturalist value-free defense of the role of the goals of reproduction and survival in determinations of healthy against Kingma’s claims to the contrary (2013, 2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Even *unhealthy* fetuses and *demented* adults have a potential that accounts for their moral status. It may be that the harm is preempted or overdetermined by disease, but then the harm should be considered the combination of the disease and death, what McMahan calls “Overall Losses” (2002, 127-36) and Neil Feit labels “Plural Harm” (2013). Killing the incapacitated contributes to the overall or plural harm that the patient suffers. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. I am indebted to Ali Thornton for suggesting that I elaborate upon the relationship between our health, moral status, and right to life. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. I am not advocating Boorse’s particular biostatistical approach to health and disease, just his commitment to disease being understood in terms of an account of dysfunction that is value-free (i.e., dysfunction doesn’t entail the condition is harmful or devalued by society). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The interest in health is a prima facie interest. When individuals become conscious, they can develop other interests than just in their health and those can be opposed to their health. It can even be in one’s interest to be unhealthy if a pathology will get on removed from the front lines in a suicidal war or if one is better off dead than alive because there is no alternative to one suffering great pain or indignities. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. In her commentary on my paper, Thornton wondered whether a human fetus that would not develop a healthy mind would have a right to life. I can’t deal with such complications in any detail but will make two brief remarks. First, one should arguably treat unhealthy human fetuses much like one treat the born who become or always were cognitively impaired to the same extent. The born - whether young or elderly - do not lose their moral status with the onset of mental impairments that prevent or reverse mental development. While a kind of entity’s moral status may be great because individuals of that kind, when healthy, can obtain unrivaled levels of well-being, those individuals don’t lose their moral status and protections when circumstances are such that they won’t obtain such great levels of well-being. Secondly, a life could be so bad that one might think it best to let the individual die. That decision, like triage decisions by a wartime MASH unit, doesn’t reflect lower moral status in those allowed to die. Killing such individuals is a different matter. But the moral equivalence or non-equivalence between killing and letting someone die is a matter independent of my claims about a right to life based upon the fetus’s interest in obtaining the unrivaled levels of well-being that healthy human development makes possible. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Tooley (1983, 2009), Thomson (1995, 20) and Dworkin (1993, 22) share Feinberg’s view. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The benefit of acquiring a mind for the first time can’t be explained without according well-being to the mindless while some philosophers might try to explain the harm of losing one’s mind without acknowledging well-being in the mindless. In the former, a short life without consciousness is compared to the life with a mind. The harm of losing a mental life might just involve the comparison is of two possible lives, both with different durations of consciousness. However, even recourse to the latter approach can’t make the harm occur *when* the person is mindless. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See also Mauron and Baertesh (2010, 96-103). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ana Iltis expressed some doubts that a fetus when mindless has only interests in healthy development. She is correct. Mindless fetuses have indirect interests in future goods other than health in virtue of those direct interests in health linking them to future states where they will have interests in goods of which they are presently ignorant due to their immaturity. I am borrowing Jeff McMahan’s conception of time-relative interests, with one major exception. McMahan believes minimally conscious fetuses and newborns have interests in future goods that they are presently unaware of because the continuity of their present mental life will link them to that future, making those futures goods theirs. The greater the mental continuity between the present and future interests, the greater the prudential interest in the future. The major difference between my account of time-relative interests and McMahan’s, is that I believe the mindless have interests in healthy mental development that link them fairly strongly to their future, making the deprivation of that future a great harm. McMahan believes interests only arise with the onset of conscious capabilities. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Like Devolder and Harris’s (2007) example, Mary-Ann Warren’s unlucky space explorer in an alien world whose cells, if disaggregated, can generate millions of clones is supposed to undermine the appeal of potentiality (1973). Tooley is especially fond of Warren’s putative anti-potential counterexample, appealing to them in at least four of his own polemics against potentiality (1983, 2009, 2013a, 2013b). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. I would like to thank the audience of the 2022 Henle conference and especially my commentator, Allison Thornton, for helpful comments. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)